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FOREWORD
For all of the attention that is accorded leadership,
very little has been written about the day-to-day challenges of command. Dr. Simons’ Letort Paper aims
to redress this gap. She examines 21st-century challenges of command through the lens of Special Operations Force (SOF) experiences in Afghanistan (and to
a lesser extent Iraq), primarily at the O-4 through O-6
level. Her purpose is twofold: to describe the kinds
of choices commanders face under the dual pressures
of too little time and too much (incomplete) information, and to draw attention to the debilitating effects
of what she dubs “objectiveless warfare.” The lack of
clear, tangible objectives is but one among a number
of factors that, she contends, prevent commanders
at all levels from being able to affect lasting changes.
However, rather than use this to tee up the usual argument about the need for a coherent strategy, she concentrates instead on hierarchy, and argues that without a singular hierarchy, coherent strategy will prove
insufficient.
According to Dr. Simons, hierarchy is the most
powerful antidote to paralysis humans have yet invented, whereas multiple hierarchies lead to “stakeholder fratricide.” She makes a provocative case for
why, in the style of General George C. Marshall, the
military should revisit the rubric of “singular hierarchy + ownership.” By this she means that one individual and his/her staff needs to “own” the war or
the problem (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria [ISIS], etc.) until it is resolved, or until the commander is removed on the unlikely chance
that the objectives one sets cannot be met.
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Simons highlights the importance of decisiveness,
while also explaining how adoption of a “singular hierarchy + ownership” approach can help both protect
and promote variation within the officer corps. In her
view, variation is essential for being able to out-think
and out-adapt adversaries.
This Letort Paper merits attention for several reasons. Among them: today’s O-4s through O-6s comprise the only pool from among which tomorrow’s
senior commanders will come. For the remainder of
their careers, this generation of officers will be shaped
by where, when, with whom, and under whom they
served in Afghanistan (and Iraq). Differences among
commanders’ experiences will not only color their decision-making going forward, but will inevitably affect their views of one another. Two possibilities exist:
so many different perspectives could pose problems,
or variations within the officer corps could prove beneficial. According to Simons, the Army can turn variation into a boon so long as it puts a second inherent
strength—hierarchy—to greater use. Hierarchy, after
all, is the military’s organizing principle. However, as
this Letort Paper counter-intuitively suggests, it may
be underutilized.
			
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Among lessons said to have been learned over the
past decade and a half is that the United States should
never again use force absent a coherent strategy. Yet,
no matter how necessary a coherent strategy is, it will
prove insufficient unless the problem of too many
competing hierarchies is likewise addressed. A second complicating challenge for those in 21st-century
command is churn: churn of personnel, of units, and
of responsibility. Without there being a commanding general, a supreme commander, or some “one”
individual placed in charge for the duration, decisive
results will remain elusive.
Not being able to be decisive or to attain meaningful tangible objectives turns warfare into an unnecessarily wicked problem. Worse, when talented
O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s see even four-star generals being
stymied in their efforts to exert command, the allure
of stars (and respect for those wearing them) begins
to wear thin. Yet, today’s O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s are the
only pool from which tomorrow’s senior leaders will
come.
Consequently, problems loom for the U.S. Army
and the military. But fortunately, the institution also
has the makings of a solution at its disposal. By putting
two of its inherent strengths—hierarchy as its organizing principle, and variation among its officers—to
greater use, the institution should be able to mitigate
today’s most pressing command challenges.
For instance, the Department of Defense (DoD)
could adopt a “singular hierarchy + ownership” approach when prosecuting future wars. It could place
a single commander and command team in charge,
from inception of a strategy through its execution.
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Doing so should guarantee that the strategy devised
might actually be a strategy that could be executed,
since those devising it would be those responsible for
executing it. With their reputation(s) on the line and
with no ability to cast blame elsewhere, the command
team would also have no choice but to fully invest in
all of the forces under its command, since these would
now be its forces. At the same time, with total ownership, those conceiving the strategy would have every
incentive to design it so as to return everyone home
in as little time as it takes to complete the job, with no
prospect of their having to return to finish the job at a
later date.
Ownership of a war or problem set would recalibrate commitment throughout the force. At the same
time, with greater continuity would come greater familiarity—with the problem set, with the adversary,
with local allies, and among subordinate units.
Because it will be impossible to out-adapt 21st-century adversaries without creative thinking, variation
in how officers think needs to be promoted and protected. A commanding general (CG) confident of his
or her position should have no reason to fear dissent
or disagreement. Because, too, 21st-century command
involves managing, and overseeing the management
of, people—and not just hardware—it is imperative
that commanders be able to read, vet, and assess people and situations quickly and accurately. To recruit,
unleash, and retain diverse talent, the military needs
to both re-valorize these skills and recognize them as
essential components of command.
In short, variation matters. However, it cannot
flourish constructively without singular leadership at
the top.
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21ST-CENTURY CHALLENGES OF COMMAND:
A VIEW FROM THE FIELD
OVERVIEW1
In a 2013 interview, retired Lieutenant General
(LTG) David Barno cited a retired four-star from another Service who told him, “we drive out the best
generals at lieutenant colonel [LTC].”2 At the time,
Barno was being interviewed about the release of
his co-authored report, “Building Better Generals,” a
report that makes a number of interesting and even
edgy recommendations about how to “fix” the general
officer (GO) corps, but does not go nearly far enough
to address issues that have turned command into an
unnecessarily wicked problem. Or so I will contend in
what follows.
This Letort Paper’s purpose is twofold. First, to examine the challenges of command confronting officers
(O-4 to O-6) today, in order to, second, make the case
that regardless of whether war remains objectiveless
or returns to a type the United States can effectively
prosecute, the military needs to make far better use of
hierarchy than it currently does.
In order to recruit, unleash, and retain talent as
well as to prevail in complex entanglements like Afghanistan (or Iraq), the military needs to (re)recognize
that:
1. Hierarchy is key;
2. Ownership of problems is imperative; and,
3. Variation in the officer corps is critical.
Or, to put this in the vernacular: some “one” needs to
be put in charge—and that someone needs to set goals
that are realistic, based on what operators can achieve.
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This means that leaders need to understand and be
able to be honest about what their people are: a) currently capable of, and b) can be made to be capable of
doing. A second critical command task is to be able to
accurately and effectively read others—which raises
the tricky question of whether “reading others” is a
trait or a skill. Is it something that can be taught? Or
can it only be selected for?
While there is a vast literature on leadership, much
less attention has been paid to the components (versus
the mechanics) of command.
If you had observed commanders at the O-4 to O-6
level in Afghanistan (2013-14) or in Iraq (2011) on the
cusp of the retrograde of U.S. forces, here are some of
the things that might have struck you at the Special
Operations Task Force (SOTF) or the Combined Joint
Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) levels, which
are the lenses through which this Letort Paper examines command challenges.
To keep operations running on any given day,
commanders needed their staffs to stay: a) aware,
b) poised, and c) planning, all while d) providing support to component units, and e) answering calls from
“Higher.”
While “a” through “e” in turn entailed “f” through
“l”:
f) 
coordinating and synchronizing internally, as
well as:
• externally—with U.S. forces;
• externally—with Coalition partners;
• externally—with Afghans; and,
• externally—with others, e.g. non-governmental organizations (NGOs), media, etc.
g) coordinating and/or supporting training/
advising;
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h) coordinating and/or supporting key leader
engagements (KLEs);
i) monitoring and supporting tactical operations;
j) 
preparing—planning, organizing, and putting
logistics into motion—for the upcoming retrograde;
k) 
coordinating and preparing—planning, organizing, and putting logistics into motion—for
ongoing reliefs in place (RIP); and,
l) reassessing and then adjusting and re-adjusting
everything described above.
Throughout, attention had to be paid to significant
activities (SIGACTS). In addition, attention was due
to any new development, which then required being
able to distinguish between what was of immediate
significance, and what might only become relevant
later.
Meanwhile, responsibilities “f” through “l” required continual (24/7) coordination among staff,
operators, and any enablers or contractors associated
with the command, as well as anyone deemed relevant
beyond the command.
At SOTF and CJSOTF levels, the commander was
responsible for overseeing this entire gyroscope—
and he had to lead, as in offer direction, and he had
to maintain morale. His role was to both mentor and
model, which he did 24 hours a day, wittingly or not.
Nor does this list capture everything command
involved. For instance, it reveals nothing about time
horizons. Yet, as with a commander’s span of control,
time horizons expanded with rank and responsibility.
O-6 commanders at the CJSOTF level, for example,
needed to think years and not just months ahead, beyond just the effects they were trying to achieve during their rotation.
3

A favorite metaphor for describing what commanding (or even serving) in Afghanistan (or Iraq)
felt like was to have to fly the plane while building
it. However, no matter how evocative this sounds,
planes are machines. Either they will lift off and stay
in the air, or they will not. Proof of concept is simple.
In addition, once you have a working prototype, you
can mass-produce others. Unfortunately, the same
does not hold for staffs, teams, or anything comprised
of humans. Nor does it fit when talking about arrangements involving adversaries, let alone situations that
entangle multiple sets of adversaries, allies, and interested other actors.
Instead, a different metaphor struck me whenever
I sat through the approval process for the detailed
concept of operations plan (CONOPS) that team
leaders submitted before being permitted to conduct
a mission: that of a teaching hospital. During grand
rounds risks must be weighed, plus a lot of sharp
questioning, correcting, and mentoring occurs as juniors make weighty judgments under the supervision
of their elders. Still, hospitals only deal with patients
as individuals, and doctors try to fix them in order
to, ideally, never have to see them again. Treating
individuals does not (normally) need to fit into any
broader strategy—or mesh with what other medical
professionals in other departments or at other facilities might (or might not) be doing. In addition, while
medical mistakes can be tragic, they seldom endanger
anyone but the patient in question.3
Of course, the most common model people fall
back on when talking about the military is business,
no doubt because so much of the leadership literature
crosses over (as do executives in and out of the Department of Defense [DoD]). However, here too, corporate
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comparisons fall short. In the business world, leaders
can fire people, whereas one of many leadership challenges for military commanders is that they have to
make the most of whom they inherit, the vast majority
of whom they had no say in hiring. Command teams
themselves are comprised of at least some individuals O-6 commanders have never served with, some of
whom they may not even like. Commanders can also
count on having at least some subordinates whose
first priority will be to pursue their own agendas and
careers, along with others who know how the system
works and thereby work the system to outwait or slow
roll any directives they dislike.
Routinely scheduled changes of command introduce another wrinkle that business leaders do not
have to contend with. Not only do all military officers
need to pass through certain wickets in order to successfully compete for future echelons of command,
but subordinates have to be lined up with the appropriate follow-on assignments. Assessing who deserves
to be assigned where does not just demand judgment
on the commanding officer’s (CO) part, but invariably
sharpens the competition among those beneath him,
since officers know which jobs will advantage them
and what they should do to try to attain them. Of
course, in all organizations ambitious people jockey
for position. However, another glaring distinction
between the business world and the military is that
the military lacks objective metrics for success. There
is nothing akin to profit, volume, or market-share to
help determine who is out-performing—or will continue to out-perform—whom.
Bottom line: the military is more unique than those
who study it from an organizational behavior perspective tend to acknowledge. In fact, it is unlike any
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other institution or profession. There should be nothing revelatory in noting this except that with all of the
talk about the military as a profession, there is little to
remind policymakers that there is no substitute for the
military. Doctors could go on a prolonged strike and
other medical practitioners would pinch hit. In fact,
name the profession and, in a crisis, others would be
able to step in and assist. Nor is it a coincidence that
these others would likely be uniformed personnel.
Ironically, it is the military that has individuals who
could substitute for civilians in virtually any capacity,
whereas the reverse is hardly the case.
Indeed, the days of being able to shake and bake
a competent expeditionary military force are decades
behind us. A 21st-century war could well be over before the first draftees show up for training. Or consider what it means that the United States has no other
country capable of affecting our rescue in a crisis. No
other military has logistical capabilities comparable to
those of the United States—which means our military
comprises the only set of responders we can count
on. This alone should underscore why it is so critical
to ensure that those tasked with protecting us are as
well-commanded—and not just as well-trained—as
possible.
To be sure, there are numerous challenges of command. Many involve all too predictable human dynamics. Because few of these will change in the foreseeable future, one aim of this Letort Paper will be to
identify and call attention to realities about humans
that the military should be able to make more of, as
well as those it should better mitigate.
Five sections follow; in the next, a number of ethnographic observations are made, and the concept of
objectiveless warfare is introduced. “COMMAND—
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IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE,” further describes
what contemporary command has entailed at the O-4
to O-6 level, within Special Operations Forces (SOF).
“AFGHANISTAN—CASE IN POINT” tackles the
question of “who should convey what to whom?”
with the aim of examining sources and flows of information. This examination is followed up in “SINGULAR HIERARCHY + OWNERSHIP” by identifying
additional challenges that plague coordination and
collaboration. This is done as a prelude to outlining
ways in which adopting a “singular hierarchy + ownership” approach—from the design of a strategy all
the way through its execution—would dissipate many
of today’s command complications. Finally, “FURTHER THOUGHTS AND OTHER APPROACHES”
suggests additional lines of inquiry not adequately
covered here.
This Letort Paper is drawn on first and secondhand
observations by the present author that were gathered
over the course of multiple trips to Afghanistan and
Iraq (2008-14), and 18-plus years’ worth of conversations in and out of the classroom.
In a nutshell, this Letort Paper’s argument revolves around the surprisingly underutilized usefulness of well-led hierarchy. If one had to assign a bumper sticker slogan to this Letort Paper’s argument, it
would be: a coherent strategy is necessary but insufficient without singular command.
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ETHNOGRAPHIC OBSERVATIONS
Ethnographic Truths.
Without question and as David Barno et al. write in
“Building Better Generals”:
The U.S. military needs an adaptive and creative officer corps in order to address the complex challenges
of the 21st century—where the demands of managing
an increasingly volatile international security environment and massive defense enterprise will rapidly collide with the realities of declining defense budgets
and constrained U.S. global military capabilities
[emphasis added].4

Truth be told, most who write about tomorrow’s military invoke the need for greater adaptability.5 Take,
for instance, Michael Colarusso and David Lyle’s
monograph, Senior Officer Talent Management: Fostering Institutional Adaptability.6 Colarusso and Lyle recommend myriad ways to broaden and deepen Service
members’ experiences and education. They also extol
the virtues of differentiating people; they want the
Army to seek and employ “a diverse range of talents.”
However, neither they, nor Barno et al., nor even Tim
Kane in Bleeding Talent, have tackled how to square
the variation needed for true adaptive ability with
what a hierarchy requires to function effectively.7
In this Letort Paper’s view, hierarchy is key because even if the personnel system could be overhauled to better accommodate a wider range of “high
value talent,” thereby helping to retain a broader pool
of seasoned professionals, this still would not ensure
that ambitious “Type A’s” could effectively collaborate and cooperate to achieve ends broader than them-
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selves in complex environments when problem sets
have no obvious or agreed-upon solutions.
Nor do current conceptions of Mission Command
help, even though in General (GEN) (Ret.) Martin
Dempsey’s terms, Mission Command lets the Army
“decentralize capabilities and distribute operations.”8
Doctrinally speaking, Mission Command has been
described as “the exercise of authority and direction
by the commander using mission orders to ensure
disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent
to accomplish full spectrum operations.”9 However,
according to Eitan Shamir, whose Transforming Command examines the adoption of Mission Command by
the British, the Israeli, and the U.S. armies, Mission
Command only really suits—or rather, suited—the
German Army from the 19th century up through the
beginning of World War II.10
‘Auftragstaktik was more than a system of command:
it was part of a particular life style typical of Prussian
officers for more than a century.’ This latter point is
crucial to understanding the difficulties faced by contemporary modern Western militaries, possessing
different traditions of command and historical experiences, attempting to revive and adopt this style of
command.11

As both Shamir and Jörg Muth, author of Command
Culture, note, Mission Command was designed by Germans for Germans and grew out of “the sophisticated
selection, education, and commissioning process of
officers existing in Germany.” Cadets were socialized
to consider themselves as members of the elite if they
were not already the sons of noblemen or aristocrats,
and their military education started early.12 This is in
striking contrast to the make-up of the officer corps in

9

the U.S. Army at the turn of the 20th century, when
the idea of Mission Command first attracted American
attention. As Muth points out, “When the U.S. Army
decided that the Prussian/German Army should be
studied more closely because it had just won several
wars, its officers looked largely in the wrong places
and through their own cultural glasses.”13
In other words, just because Mission Command
worked well for the Germans, does not mean it fits us.
Nevertheless, at least some GOs today believe
that U.S. soldiers have effectively mastered Mission
Command. For instance, according to one assessment:
“Regardless of the strategic outcomes of these recent
wars, decentralized Mission Command has succeeded, empowering junior leaders to act boldly within
their commanders’ broad intent.”14
As it happens, this is LTG (Ret.) Barno’s assessment. Unfortunately, as he then goes on to lament:
Mission Command is now on a collision course with
the peacetime Army, which values bureaucratic process and compliance above all else. Completing surveys and online training on time, mastering PowerPoint briefings, and grasping the intricacies of training
management and readiness reporting all dominate the
life of leaders in garrison.

Barno clearly intends to sound the alarm in this passage: in the wake of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army’s
“compliance culture” is smothering initiative.15 Yet,
the contrast he draws is overdrawn. While no officers
I know would disagree with him about an ever-more
infantilizing compliance culture, Afghanistan and
Iraq were hardly process or PowerPoint-free. Instead,
midway through both wars in both theaters, legions of
officers could be found investing innumerable hours
10

in managing and massaging information on computer
screens rather than interacting with troops or with
allies.
While the distinction Barno makes between wartime freedom from bureaucracy and peacetime overbureaucratization is thus exaggerated, he also misses
something else when he urges that senior officers
should “take on this challenge directly. They must
embrace and protect a [Mission Command] leadership
philosophy anchored in trust . . . They must empower
their young leaders to say no to the bureaucracy.”
First, not everyone in uniform today is worth trusting—not given recruitment, accession, and promotion
rates that pumped quantity and not just quality into
the force over the past decade and a half. Second, it
is unrealistic to assume that O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s will
say “no” to the bureaucracy when their elders do not.
At the same time, and in fairness to LTG Barno,
those who attain the upper echelons of command invariably see things differently from those they lead.
This is a truism in all hierarchies. In addition, whom
people serve under and with, where they serve, and
when they were deployed further colors their assessments—all of which should raise important questions
about whose perspective(s) should then count, especially when it comes to informing future policy.
Looking ahead, one of the challenges the military
writ large will face is to determine which lessons of
the past 15 years should be learned and applied versus which are unique to Afghanistan and Iraq. Some
units’ hard-won knowledge will be particular to these
two countries, which begs the questions: should that
be Afghanistan and Iraq, or Afghanistan or Iraq?
Moreover, who is qualified to say? Only those who
have been to both theaters? But then (again): for how
long, where, and with whom?
11

This issue—of which lessons are, or are not, applicable elsewhere—is likely to, and arguably should,
haunt serving officers for the remainder of their careers. Worse, unlike the still contested legacy of Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq represent two very different kinds of shatter zone, which means that what
gets highlighted, forgotten, or slighted in analysis will
itself be fraught.16
Objectiveless Warfare.
Other questions that those who analyze the past
decade and a half will need to grapple with concern
the shifting nature of our conceptions of warfare.
For instance, while the United States would be best
served to treat every conflict it engages in as though
it is unique, so that templates tried in other wars cannot be misapplied, no war occurs in a vacuum. The
U.S. military was involved in both Iraq and Afghanistan well before 9/11. So—how far back in time, never
mind how far afield in space, should ex post facto
analysis extend? Can Afghanistan be considered apart
from Pakistan—though once Pakistan is considered,
doesn’t India also merit attention? What about Russia or Iran?17 How widely should analysts cast their
nets in order to capture all—or should that only be the
most relevant—factors, indicators, and perspectives?
Alternatively, how much does anyone really
need to understand in order to be able to defeat an
adversary?
Up through World War II, militaries were sent to
war to address three kinds of political problems. Force
proved indispensable when it came to:
1. Defense—of territory, population, honor, etc.;
2. Acquisition—of status; and,
3. Conquest—and material gain.
12

Prior to World War II, the subjugation and/or seizure
of territory and populations not only provided militaries with a clear role to play, but also showed that
no other arm of government was equipped to do what
only armies could. Compare this to what has come
to be expected of the military today. Washington seldom (if ever) sends anyone other than Tier 1 forces to
achieve tangible objectives.
Certainly, no discernible game-changing, destroyit-and-they-won’t-continue-to-fight objectives have
been set for (or by) the U.S. military since 9/11.
Yet, psychologically speaking, objectives are far
more important than policymakers seem to realize.
For instance, in Kandak: Fighting with Afghans, Patrick
Hennesy (who served with the Grenadier Guards) describes the anticipation soldiers feel while waiting to
hit a physical objective and the relief that comes once
“action” is underway. From Hennesy’s descriptions, it
is clear that both action and relief affect morale, since
both are integral to the conviction that progress is
being made.
Essentially, if soldiers, units, and those in charge
know they are not going to be able to get out of a situation, country, or war without doing A, B, or C, then
generally everyone will not only be eager, but also
anxious to do whatever it takes to accomplish those
A, B, or C.
Having a distinct, distinguishable enemy helps.
However, perhaps as important as having an identifiable adversary is having physical objectives. In addition, as Hennesy learns, keeping units in the same
location for too long is debilitating. It is likewise detrimental to ask them to take or, worse, retake and then
abandon ground. Not only does this prove demoralizing, but it turbo-charges cynicism.
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Hennesy is hardly the first author to make these
observations. Martin Van Creveld remarked much the
same thing about Israel’s occupation of the West Bank
and Gaza, which he found to be corrosive to the Israeli
Defense Forces.18 Or, as one commander of U.S. Army
Rangers said in Afghanistan: “Rangers are adrenaline
junkies. They seek adversity in order to have a sense
of success; they need measurable success.”19
Indeed, talk to experienced SOF officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and many concede that
while getting to kill the enemy and engage in and survive firefights is initially exhilarating, over time—and
with maturity—going on missions night after night
needs to add up to something beyond just more of
the same.20 Over time there needs to be some tangibly
evident gain. Otherwise, there is nothing to measure
success against.21
Historically, too, reaching, keeping, or smashing
objectives and being able to move on without having
to fear for your rear (or flanks) has been essential to
declaring victory.
At the broadest level, it should go without saying
that no war can be won until one side concedes defeat. Typically, this has required either seizing people
by the shorthairs or threatening them sufficiently and
credibly that they give up. You usually have to kill
their hope, and not just their will to continue. Or, to be
blunt: you win—and they prove they have given up—
only once they accede to whatever terms you choose.22
Perhaps no one better captures the command challenges thrown up by the lack of clearly articulated objectives since 9/11 than GEN Stanley McChrystal, the
man who was in putative charge in Afghanistan from
2009-10.
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Redefining ISAF’s [International Security Assistance
Force]—and America’s—mission in Afghanistan became a central issue. In June, I’d directed our team
to conduct the strategic assessment based upon our
understanding of the mission as outlined by President
Obama in speeches prior to that time. Although the
importance of Al Qaeda was never in doubt, we had
interpreted that our mission included helping the nation of Afghanistan develop the ability to defend its
sovereignty.23

This passage deserves a close read for two reasons.
First, the fact that the commander of Coalition and
U.S. forces in Afghanistan had to interpret what he
thought the President’s mission was, based on recorded speeches rather than receiving the mission directly
from the President himself, reveals that there was no
set objective. Second, we see just how broken the notion of hierarchy has become. Not only should the
President have transmitted the mission clearly and in
person to GEN McChrystal, but when he did not, why
didn’t GEN McChrystal demand an accounting?
Many might think that the communications breakdown described in the previous passage points to a
“civil-military” disconnect. Perhaps, however, my
thesis here is that there is a deeper problem: hierarchy
has been misused, both by the civilian leadership and
by the military (the topic of this Letort Paper).
If, meanwhile, we examine what has transpired
through the lens of James Q. Wilson’s work on bureaucracy, here is one possible reading: while the purpose
of the U.S. military may be to a) win the nation’s wars;
b) defend the United States; and c) reproduce itself in
order to be able to accomplish “a” and/or “b,” when
“a” and “b” are not well-defined or clearly articulated,
the path of least resistance will be to default to “c.”
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Further applying Wilson’s framework, we might
also conclude that whenever a bureaucracy lacks a
coherent strategy or a singular goal, and/or when
those within it do not share a common vision, it—the
bureaucracy—will fall prey to people advancing their
own agendas. Sometimes these agendas will converge.
Nevertheless, even when they do, horse-trading occurs. The problem horse-trading creates is that dealing in quid pro quos can all too quickly substitute for
feeling the need to demand an objective, since trading
among the tradeoffs can itself become the objective.24
This describes what a visitor to Afghanistan could
see transpiring prior to the retrograde of U.S. forces. It
also fits with others’ observations about the prosecution of the war there (and in Iraq): in the absence of
a coherent vision, commanders reverted to processes.
Absent a strategy, commanders concentrated on operations. Arguably, they did so from the inception of
both wars. Or, as GEN McChrystal writes in his memoir, from 2003 until 2005 his Task Force in Iraq “had
drawn up targeting decks, not maps: We executed
missions; we did not wage campaigns.”25
GEN McChrystal is worth citing throughout this
Letort Paper because, more than any other GO of his
generation, he continues to exemplify leadership for
numerous O-6s who served under him, and remains
among the only senior commanders many say they
would have voluntarily followed anywhere.26 Yet,
not even GEN McChrystal, as a four-star, could get
the system under him (never mind the policymaking
world above him) to work as effectively as he needed
it to. For instance, the “Afghan hands” program frustrated him. He was “sent a number of non-volunteers
and noncompetitive officers,” which echoes complaints another four-star commander, GEN Abizaid,
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registered about Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in
Iraq.27 According to David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, when
Abizaid was the overall U.S. commander in Iraq, he
pressed:
[GEN] Casey to bolster the U.S. advisory teams that
were embedded in Iraqi army and police units. Abizaid believed the teams were the key to victory, and
he had been frustrated that senior Army officers in the
Pentagon had staffed them for years with mostly inexperienced troops.28

Chronic disregard for how both of these programs were staffed—no matter how secondary the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands (AFPAK) Hands (APH)
Program and MiTT program might seem to some— is
emblematic of what four-star generals could not get
prioritized. More telling still, the fact that commanding generals (CGs) in charge of prosecuting a war
were not fully supported by their peers or by the bureaucracy reveals a system comprised of parts that not
only could, but also did work against each other.
As Tim Kane summarizes one aspect of the larger
problem:
The military’s problem is a deeply anti-entrepreneurial structure at the gritty level of personnel policy.
From officer evaluations to promotions to job assignments, all branches of the military operate more like a
government bureaucracy with a unionized workforce
than a cutting-edge meritocracy.29

As Kane and other critics point out, the military’s personnel system is deeply flawed. One hears this time
and again from serving officers. However, even if the
personnel system were fixed, my contention is that this
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would still not solve the problem GENs McChrystal
and Abizaid encountered, which is that as commanders, they could not make the system work. Couple
this inability to truly command with the fact that the
military is predicated on the most powerful antidote
to paralysis humans have yet invented—namely,
well-led hierarchy—and the socio-illogical disconnects should be glaringly obvious.
Indeed, the fact that three- and four-star generals
(to include combatant commanders) still cannot make
a whole range of decisions on their own today, but
must first seek others’ concurrence points to major
flaws in how hierarchy is organized. One unfortunate
consequence is that this leaves talented O-4s, O-5s,
and O-6s increasingly wondering why anyone should
strive to earn one, two, or three stars if, by the time
they reach four-star rank, they still cannot fully command.
In light of this, the implications for whom the military will subsequently retain, and whom it will lose—
and at what long-term costs—are profound.
System Failure.
While constructive critics like Tim Kane blame
the antiquated personnel system for stifling initiative
from below, others, like Tom Ricks, have placed the
blame elsewhere.
If the Army is serious about having an officer corps
that is adaptive, it needs to try to carry out a major
cultural shift that enables it to embrace accountability,
rather than shun it. This is not as difficult as it might
sound. Generals should be relieved not just for personal foibles but for poor performance in command.30
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From Ricks’ perspective, accountability is the engine
that drives adaptability. However, as essential as accountability is, my argument is that ownership is the
overarching missing link.31 For instance, one would
be hard pressed to find anyone more willing to adapt
or to hold himself accountable than GEN McChrystal.
Yet, GEN McChrystal recognized how important it
was to be in sole command, since this is exactly what
he sought as a Task Force commander:
I wanted John [Abizaid] to agree that I would be the
commander of all my forces in his theater. No matter my location, I would be his single point of contact
and of responsibility. It may seem an arcane point of
military hierarchy, but intuitively I believed the unprecedented campaign TF [Task Force] 714 was faced,
across a wide geographic area would demand as much
unity and consistency in leadership as possible.32

It is hard to examine 21st-century challenges of
command and not conclude that ownership is the
necessary complement to a singular hierarchy. As
this Letort Paper will subsequently suggest, so long
as variation can be protected within the force, “singular hierarchy + ownership” is a greater guarantor
of adaptability than anything else the military might
try. However, building the right kind of variation, and
giving individuals enough, but not too much, rope is
tricky.
This is, in part, because militaries have long depended on a paradox: attrition requires that the institution regard everyone as interchangeable. Yet, every
individual in uniform needs to believe they are indispensable; this is among the things that inspire members of the military to give their all.
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Perhaps nothing better exemplifies the inherent
tension between being special (as in uniquely necessary) and being just another uniform or, in this case,
Green Beret, than the story of Jim Gant, a Special Forces (SF) Army major (MAJ). As his now-wife, (former
Washington Post reporter) Ann Scott Tyson reports,
Admiral (ADM) Olson (the then-Special Operations
Command [SOCOM] commander) referred to Gant
as the “Lawrence of Afghanistan.” In November 2009,
ADM Olson was so taken with Gant’s concept for how
to unite Afghanistan one tribe at a time that he lent
Gant’s concept for a tribal engagement team (TET) his
full support. Olson’s enthusiasm trickled down the
chain of command:
‘You are getting your TET,’ [Colonel (COL) David]
Maxwell wrote to Jim [on behalf of LTG John Mulholland, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) CO] . . . . ‘You basically will be able
to write your own ticket. ADM Olson wants you and
your team to do some focused training to prepare you,
but the longer-term goal is for you and your team to
become the future Lawrences of Afghanistan. Bottom
line is you are going to be on the cutting edge.’33

Then-COL Don Bolduc subsequently used Gant’s
field-site (Mangwel) “as a shining success story in his
official PowerPoint briefings on village stability operations [VSO]” while then-Brigadier General (BG)
Scott “Miller said he needed more Special Forces officers with Jim’s skill and commitment. ‘I wish I had
more Jim Gants, to be quite honest’.”34 In a crowning
achievement, GEN David Petraeus himself awarded
Gant with a Joint Service Commendation Medal after
a 4-hour long visit to Mangwel.35
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Given so much attention from commanders at
the highest level, it is hard to imagine how Jim Gant
would not have felt special, and so indispensable that
the normal rules no longer applied. However, once he
had broken too many to continue to ignore—
You drank alcohol downrange. You took drugs and
had unauthorized drugs in your room. You put your
men at risk . . . and you gave Ann Scott Tyson access
to classified information and moved her around the
battlefield36

—it no longer mattered how much support Gant had
previously received from the brass. He was found
eminently dispensable. Indeed, here is what LTG John
Mulholland said to Gant before drumming him out of
the SF:
There is nothing special at all about what you did or
what you were asked to do. Absolutely nothing you
did in your military career, in particular what you did
over there, matters any more. Reading your statement,
it’s very apparent to me that you have a skewed perception of yourself and your importance to the war
and to the Regiment.37

Interestingly, one sees this interchangeability/indispensability paradox at work up and down the chain
of command: GEN David McKiernan out, McChrystal
in, McChrystal out, Petraeus in—with no strenuous
public objections from anyone about the pitfalls of
churn at the strategic level, or about how churn only
further guarantees the abject lack of objectives of 21stcentury warfare.
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COMMAND—IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
Objectiveless warfare could be seen to affect O-4,
O-5, and O-6 commanders in Afghanistan in at least
four ways.
First, it created unnecessary complexity. By 2014,
as the retrograde of U.S. forces was underway, there
were so many moving pieces and parts, and so many
seams and points of friction between multiple “us”s
and multiple “them”s that it was hard for many commanders at the O-4 through O-6 levels to see how they
could help SOF operators help Afghans make any
truly lasting gains.
Second, because the stakes in objectiveless warfare
cannot be considered existential (otherwise, defeating
the enemy would be the clear, unmistakable goal),
COs ended up in the untenable position of having to
continually weigh whether risks to their men were
truly worth it.
Third, fighting by coalition, by rotating units
through different areas of operation, by manning
staffs with individual augmentees, and so on, was a
major (or continual) source of destabilization—the
tail, which was supposed to support the tooth, served
to imbalance the dog.
Finally, hierarchy—the way the military currently
formulates it—has grown to include so many people
at the top that rather than being comprised of a single
structure, it resembles the Valley of the Kings: lots of
pyramids, lots of dynasties, and plenty of status displays sucking up inordinate amounts of support. Indeed, by June 2014, it was said that there were more
GOs in Afghanistan than SF Operational Detachment
Alphas (ODAs), and ODAs were among the only units
still interacting with Afghans.
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To further set the scene: at every level of command
(ODA, Advanced Operational Base [AOB], SOTF, and
CJSOTF), operations centers were staffed 24 hours a
day.38 Staff members were on duty to monitor and
react around the clock, while the fact that they monitored multiple computer screens and had access to
multiple networks meant that they could be tasked
with additional work while standing watch—which
certainly might have seemed efficient at the time, but
the “product” they produced only then made more
work for others, giving everyone more to have to read,
edit, manage, respond to, correct, counter, update,
etc.39
Had a team of ethnographers been sent to Afghanistan to conduct classic timed observations of behavior,
they would have spent their days (or nights) making
notations next to a column of headings which would
have been labeled: typing, reading/surfing computer
screens, conducting business by phone (landline/
cell phone); interacting with officemates; interacting
with colleagues from other workspaces; walking to
the operations center/bathroom/another office; making/drinking coffee; working out; and eating/getting
food.
The “Higher” ranking the individual, the more privacy they were afforded—but not by much.40 People
on all staffs and in all Tactical Operations Centers
(TOC) and Joint Operations Centers (JOC) worked
with constant interruptions, sidebar conversations,
and other distractions, but few diversions. Life was
stripped down to work, and working out. Alternative
activities for those who had (or were willing to make)
the time might include watching movies, attending church services, and playing volleyball in some
locations.
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Accepting that some (if not most) of the work being done was deemed critical by someone somewhere,
many of those who were stuck living this Groundhog
Day-like existence wondered why they needed to be
physically present at all. Since few left their bases,
they wondered why they could not do their work
remotely—much as drone pilots do. They asked this
question not just because they missed their families
(and a more normal existence), but for security reasons: the more people there were in-theater, the more
servicing and protection they required, the bigger the
U.S. footprint became, and the more of an irritant/target that made Americans.41 Few saw the value in this.
However, GEN McChrystal believed there was a
benefit in having his analysts “live and operate forward, teamed with counterparts from other agencies,”
because this:
decreased the gravitational pull of their headquarters
back in D.C. and dramatically increased the sense of
shared mission and purpose. It was extraordinarily
powerful for analysts to share information, to brief
operators on their assessments, to hear the rotors of an
assault force launching on their information, and then
to debrief together after the operation.42

GEN McChrystal’s view is worth citing (again) for
several reasons. First, he was commanding his own
organization. Thus, his perspective is not the same as
that of someone working on a staff in someone else’s
realm. Second, his Task Forces always had a well-defined focus: man-hunting. Arguably, this made their
lives easier. Because Task Force members’ interactions
with Afghans were generally one-sided, and few interacted with Afghans at all, they and the analysts and
staff who supported them could afford a more Manichean view of the war: there were regular everyday
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Afghans and then there were very bad Afghans.43 Unlike others, too, Task Force members were able to see
the direct result of their operations in real time on giant plasma screens. Being able to see the targeting and
killing of weapons-bearing Afghan males reinforced
their sense of purpose. So, too, did the more intense
pace at which they worked on their much shorter rotations. Basically, no one on any of McChrystal’s Task
Forces could afford the time for morale to sink.
In contrast, others’ experiences were far messier.
Some of this had to do with more frequent interactions with more Afghans, as well as fewer cut-and-dry
missions. But also, across sister SOTFs and AOBs (the
two echelons of command below the CJSOTF level),
different SF, U.S. Navy’s Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL)
Teams, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) commanders exhibited
significantly different command styles, and the decisions they made had cumulative effects. For instance,
it rarely took long after walking into a JOC or TOC
to be able to gauge the overall mood: either key staff
members were upbeat and willing to get work done
or they were visibly ground down. As one MAJ explained, exhaustion from doing and thinking was very
different from exhaustion caused by a commander
who thwarted initiative or was inconsistent and too
demanding.
Command—In Theory.
If we turn to the literature, how is command described? According to one definition, it is “the purposeful exercise of authority over structures, resources, people and activities . . . comprised of three, often
reinforcing, components: authority, management and
leadership.”44 Management “is primarily concerned
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with the allocation and control of resources (i.e. human, financial and material) to achieve objectives,”
while leadership “deals with the purpose of the organization—‘doing the right thing’ versus ‘doing it
right’.”45
For the British, command is said to be: “comprised
of leadership, decision making, and control.” In the
United States, “In addition to leadership [which subsumes influencing people and decision-making], command also includes authority.”46
As for how authority is exerted at the highest levels,
Tom Ricks describes generalship as usually involving:
being able to impose one’s will on a large organization
engaged in the most stressful of human activities. It
is almost always driven by the twofold ability first to
anticipate problems and devise solutions and then to
get people to execute the resulting plans.47

Later on in The Generals, Ricks writes that “successful generalship involves first figuring out what to do,
then getting people to do it. It has one foot in the intellectual realm of critical thinking and the other in the
human world of management and leadership.”48
Again, some consider managing and leading to be
distinctly different things. Edward Kosner describes
the difference this way: “A leader’s job is to create
and enunciate a vision and to inspire his followers to
pursue it—‘the vision thing,’ as George H. W. Bush
so famously put it. The manager’s job is to make the
vision tangible.”49 For Eitan Shamir, leadership is the
“capacity to generate cultural change,” and the methods leaders use to affect change include:
What they pay attention to, measure, and control;
Their reaction to critical incidents and organizational
crisis;
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Resource allocation;
Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching;
Awarding rewards and status; and
Recruitment, selection, promotion, and communication procedures.50

Interestingly, while The Economist considers management to be “one of the most successful industries
of the past century,” thus making it a critically important component of organizations, it seems likely that,
when given a choice, most people would far rather be
inspired, challenged, taken seriously, and led than be
managed.51
Contours of Command—In Practice.
Still, none of these descriptions quite does justice
to what command actually entails. Ironically, anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s self-description, written for
as non-military an audience as it is possible to imagine, may come closest:
Pitched early into things, I assumed, and I still assume, that what you are supposed to do is keep going
with whatever you can find lying about to keep going
with: to get from yesterday to today without foreclosing tomorrow.52

To be sure, as preeminent as Geertz was in anthropology, he commanded nothing but respect. In contrast, commanders in Afghanistan (and Iraq) were responsible for training, assessing, assembling, and then
moving individuals, units, equipment, and weapons
platforms against the enemy, in support of allies, and
throughout their (or what was often someone else’s)
battlespace. They did so while contending with all
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manner of time pressures: self-induced; situationdependent; and, chain of command-driven.
As LTG (Ret.) James Dubik has described it:
Strategic leaders must hold in their minds simultaneously the following: individual acts (the current present), the broader whole of collective potential reactions and response (the ever-unfolding present), and
how both can be used to achieve the envisioned goal
(the future).53

In Afghanistan (and Iraq), CJSOTF, SOTF, and AOB
commanders did their best to think along each of these
three time horizons, though they also had to nest the
effects they were trying to achieve within those established by whoever was above them—which in turn
required understanding or accurately interpreting
what “Higher,” or even more specifically, what their
immediate boss wanted to have happen and/or was
trying to achieve.
Commanders also had to synchronize what they
were using as they tried to have effects. Yet, they themselves controlled very few assets. Flow was key. But
so was knowing which instruments to bring to bear, in
what order and combination, and from who to attain
them. Tempo affected everything—from stress levels
to being able to stream support when forces were in
extremis.
Thus far, still, I am only outlining the perceptible
mechanics of command. What commanders spent an
inordinate amount of time doing was actually managing, and overseeing the management of, people—not
hardware. This absorbed most of their attention, directly or indirectly. Or, to return to the interchangeability/indispensability paradox, one dimension of the
conundrum commanders dealt with was that though
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men and women under their command may have been
their most important assets (since they couldn’t do
anything without them), they also couldn’t let those
they led feel as though they were ever just being used.
Beyond needing (or wanting) to feel purposeful,
units and the individuals in them had to be able to be
effectively synced so that the whole worked together
as opposed to pulling apart or, worse, working at
cross-purposes. Synchronizing and keeping everyone
synced was the command team’s job.54
In Afghanistan (and Iraq), commanders likewise
had to contend with the fact that many of the pieces
and parts under their command were rarely of uniform size. Components, to include units that appeared
to be identical on table of organization and equipment
(TOE) charts, shrank and expanded, especially when
contractors and enablers were folded into the mix.
One way in which some commanders approached
these challenges was to think of them as problem sets.
A commander’s job was to stay on top of problems:
by stopping them, fixing them, preventing them, identifying them before they occurred, and by creating
them for others—e.g., adversaries. Commanders liked
to think prevention of problems was valued by “Higher,” yet they also recognized that no one got credit (or
was noticed) for preventing problems.
Keeping S- or J-1 through S- or J-9 shops synced
also fell under a commander’s purview. So did timing
in the most personal sense. Everyone in command had
to concern himself with multiple futures, to include
his own. Commanders had to worry about their careers, their reputations, and their status vis-à-vis one
another, which meant that among their ongoing challenges was to figure out how to enhance their position
both militarily and personally, while also protecting
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themselves and others, both literally and figuratively.
Basically, to command was to juggle multiple sets
of trade-offs simultaneously. For instance, subordinates might engage in non-doctrinaire practices that
they were convinced would help them establish rapport with their counterparts and/or the locals, but
which the military overall considered to be detrimental to good order and discipline. Beards represent a
great case in point. For 13 years and counting, beards
helped distinguish SOF operators from others. As a
consequence, by 2014 many SOF operators were convinced that Afghans used beards to identify which
Americans to trust, respect, and/or fear. In operators’
eyes that made beards a force protection measure, and
not just a status symbol. However, because beards
seldom sat well with General Purpose Forces (GPF)
battlespace owners, this placed SOF commanders on
the horns of a dilemma. Which would do them more
good: building rapport with conventional commanders, which meant disallowing beards, or permitting
their operators to do what those before them had?55
While a seemingly minor issue, more has always
been read into “beards” than meets the eye. Indeed,
beards point to what was perhaps commanders’ most
persistent challenge: contending with others’ decisions and judgments. Commanders frequently had to
redo, undo, or adjust decisions predecessors and subordinates made. Adjustments “here” then required
readjustments elsewhere. The same happened with
decisions that came down from on high. Commanders
had to be able to quickly react to everything from Requests for Information (RFI) to only partially informed
directives, though even silly directives could prove
easier to deal with than questions posed by “Higher”
for ambiguous or unstated, and thus suspect, reasons.
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Or, as one S-3 put it, he spent his days juggling rubber and glass balls. Ultimately, his boss (the CJSOTF
commander) had to have faith that his S-3 could accurately differentiate between which balls were rubber and which glass, or which problems the command
team could afford to resolve later and which had better be addressed now.
This, actually, points to the crux of what rendered
command so endlessly challenging—or difficult and
uncomfortable for anyone who was not adept at reading and assessing other people’s capabilities: who
could commanders rely on, and for what? Especially
as they worked along multiple timelines simultaneously.
The iterative aspects of command required that information be updated continuously. Dynamics to be
monitored in Afghanistan included:
• dynamics internal to the command and its constituent units;
• dynamics internal to other military components in the battlespace—U.S. military, Coalition, Afghan;
• dynamics internal to Afghans, both locally and
nationally; and then,
• the state of play among all of these and whoever else might be in the area.
This comprised an immense amount of forces to
keep track of. And though paying attention to ever
shifting dynamics among Afghans might seem as
though it would have been a commander’s top priority, few commanders at the O-4 through O-6 level
interacted with Afghans (or the same Afghans) every day.56 This is what their teams and operators
did. Consequently, flows of information about what
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was happening among Afghans, while critical, came
highly filtered (as we will see in “CASE IN POINT:
AFGHANISTAN,” in this Letort Paper).
Information Flows.
In general, information flows serve either to stitch
things together or to unravel them. Because, too, flows
these days are continual, it is extremely difficult for
anyone to control who is conveying what to whom
once patterns get set, especially since informal flows
always augment formal reporting. Officers who are
good at command seem to work out ahead of time
(or in short order) who they want conveying what to
whom. To do so effectively, however, requires that
they quickly learn whom they can rely on, and for
what. How did commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq
ascertain this?
Reputational vetting is SOF’s premier extracurricular activity. The academic literature has long
recognized gossip (or the exchange of information
about others) as a critical social lubricant. However,
when there is no immediate way to know how much
esteem to accord (or trust to place in) others, vetting
hearsay itself becomes vitally important. At the same
time, when someone knows he will be talked about
the same way he talks about others, that helps keep
him and everyone else more or less in line—and still
striving. Since reputation is everyone’s most precious
commodity, this dynamic applies to, and is applied
by, commanders and subordinates alike. However, it
is especially attenuated for commanders who face a
double bind given that what they do with their time
can help make or break their reputations, and time is
their scarcest resource.
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Commanders’ time is valuable for at least four
reasons. First, no commander can possibly give sufficient, let alone equal attention to everything—not
when there is a need to perpetually weigh expediency
against effectiveness. Second, commanders have to
delegate. However, what should they give up, and to
whom? This may well be the most important decision
they make since if they get this right, their decision
will help set them up for success. However, if they
get this wrong (concern number 3), they will not just
have problems, but their mistakes will make them the
subject of others’ commentary, commentary that they
then cannot control (concern number 4).
Again, everything commanders do telegraphs
something, which is exactly why how a commander
chooses to use his time, and what he chooses to do
himself versus delegate, reveals more about him than
virtually anything he might say.
Who Should Convey What To Whom?
Because messages are always being transmitted,
commanders have to be adept at one of two things.
They need to be good at determining what is important for them to learn about, know, or dig into firsthand versus what is nice but not essential to learn/
know themselves. Or, alternatively, they have to be
able to bank on being able to turn whatever they pay
attention to into their advantage somehow.
Different styles suit different personalities. But everyone still faced the same dilemma: did they invest
time in getting to know their personnel—in which
case, to what extent, and down to what level? Or did
they invest in cultivating other relationships instead,
knowing that they could always elicit the information
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they needed (or thought they might need) from their
subordinates?
Timing always complicated this choice. For instance, say you had no prior Afghanistan experience
and you were only slated to be in command in Afghanistan once, for one 8-month long rotation. One advantage you would have is that you could approach the
country and the situation unemotionally, with fresh
eyes and a degree of objectivity that those who knew
the men for whom firebases were named would never
have. But then: down to what level of local detail was
it important for you to go? What should you bother
absorbing and committing to memory? Especially
when anything Afghanistan-specific was perishable
and would be of little use in follow-on assignments.
To further complicate things, there is knowledge
(as in, having command over facts, dates, and figures),
and then there is understanding (having a “feel for”
and/or being able to see patterns). Understanding can
often mitigate a lack of detailed knowledge and, again,
when you are the boss, your position should grant
you the ability to count on others for what they know.
However, when most of your subordinates are new to
you, having to constantly ask them about things they
think a commander should already be familiar with
sends certain signals. Should you worry about how
they read your asking them for information they think
you should already know?
One obvious shortcut is to take the measure of key
subordinates, and rely on their experiential knowledge. For this to work, however, their information
needs to be up-to-date—since one pitfall with multiple
rotations is that people sometimes think they know
enough about location X because they spent time there
previously, without appreciating how much things
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there have changed. Or, as one commander put it: “‘I
was here in ‘08, I understand.’ No—unless you know
how it was yesterday, you don’t understand.”57
Unfortunately, there are no obvious remedies for
most of these information-takes-time quandaries—
many of which were compounded in Afghanistan
whenever commanders oversaw units from sister
organizations or other Services. Sometimes commanders’ first experience with these other units, and
thus their subordinate commanders, was only in
Afghanistan.58
All such gaps generated the potential for crossed
signals. For instance, one common justification offered for why operators at the team level were asked
for more detail than made sense to them was because
staffs at “Higher” command levels did not share their
same awareness. Intellectually, most operators understood this. However, other types of queries frustrated, alienated, and even demoralized them. Why, for
example, would a visiting GO with two O-6s in tow
and an entourage of O-5s waste time on his all-tooshort visit asking team members about something as
tactical as where soon-to-be-delivered HESCO barriers would be placed? To operators, this kind of questioning reeked of micro-management. However, if we
were to grant the visiting GO the benefit of the doubt,
maybe he was plumbing something altogether different when he asked about the HESCO barriers. Maybe
he had already visited enough locations that it didn’t
take him long to size up what he thought he needed to
know, so that a question that seemed inane to those he
was visiting served as a heuristic for him.
Even so, the degree of interest a GO or CO expressed in information that struck others as irrelevant,
and their subsequent (mis)read of this as micro-man-
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agement could matter—especially since any whiff of
being micro-managed telegraphed distrust.
There were unintentional transmissions like this,
and then there were intentional transmissions. Visits
and battlefield circulations (BFC) served both purposes. They thus provide an interesting window into the
choices commanders made.
Visits.
Often SF O-4s who served as team leaders before
becoming staff officers considered the heavy SF command presence in Afghanistan to be totally unnecessary. From their perspective, operators required
technical, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), air, and other forms of direct support. For
everything else, teams could just as easily have been
overseen from outside of Afghanistan:
Command[er]s may think they need to be present
to exert control, but to control what? Ironically, COs
have no real control when an ODA is out in an isolated
location. Actually, it’s the commanders who depend
on the ODA for information about what’s going on.
The ODA can tell COs anything, and they’re unlikely
to know or learn the difference.59

Yet, while commanders perhaps should have been
able to take on faith what their subordinates reported,
as Jim Gant’s example suggests, they still did need to
verify on occasion. Moreover, that could only be done
in person.
Also, if one aim of a visit was to check up on subordinates, another was to take subordinate commanders’ measure. Apparently, the first thing GEN Matthew Ridgway did on being assigned to Korea was to
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overfly the country at 3,000 feet, meet with the South
Korean president, and visit his battlefield commanders. He wanted to assess “their states of mind, asking
himself each time, ‘Is he confident, does he know what
he is doing, does he know the terrain in his area’?”60
Or, consider GEN McChrystal’s explanation for
why he routinely went out to observe his operators
conduct raids:
over the past three years, I had learned to carefully
watch the operators at work: After years’ worth of
daily raids, their instinctive movements and mood often told me more about the situation than they could
describe back at base.61

Visits ensured that those in the field also understood a CO’s command vision. Some commanders
felt that simply issuing their command philosophy
on paper was insufficient; they needed their troops to
be able to answer and not just ask: “What would my
boss do? What would my boss want me to do?” Particularly since the boss (as in the CJSOTF commander)
might only see their O-3s once or twice over the course
of a rotation.
COs needed their operators to keep asking themselves: “how does this contribute to what needs to be
done according to the commander’s intent?” Or, as
one CO put it: “Teams shouldn’t do stuff just because
locals or someone asks for it and it seems like a good
idea. It has to fit. It has to sync.”62
Ensuring that everyone was on the same page, and
would stay there, required dialogue. However—how
much explanation did dialogue itself require? For instance, one former team leader described an operation
that seemed to be a waste of time (or worse) from his
ODA’s perspective. The team was supposed to use
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Afghan Local Police (ALP) they had helped recruit
and train to hold a particular valley. Unfortunately,
holding the valley set the ALP up for disaster. The
ALP’s best fighters were killed. Several were beheaded by the Taliban. Maybe, this officer now guessed, it
was useful for his team and the ALP to have suffered
those losses; maybe the team’s position in the valley
took the pressure off the district center or tied down
the Taliban. But he still wondered: might not it have
helped the ODA to have been told this at the time?
This raises the age-old question: what do operators need to know? To what extent should they be
clued into the bigger picture?63 Especially in an era of
objectiveless warfare, when the big picture is demoralizing. Or, as one S-2 put it, how do you maintain
morale when: a) it is Groundhog Day, b) the mission is
nebulous, c) it is unclear what anything is adding up
to, and d) you agree with the cynics?
Here we come to the not just perennial, but increasingly pressing challenge: what level of explanation should be offered to thinking Service members?
The 21st-century twist is that the Services love to point
out how smart today’s Service members are. Yet—hierarchy can never work with wide-open information
flows and total transparency. This is because most decisions (again) involve trade-offs, and people cannot
be made to feel that they are what is being traded off.
So, how forthcoming should 21st-century commanders be? Should operators be told that they have been
given a lesser mission, are just plugging a hole, or are
where they are because theirs is a less capable team?
One other purpose visits serve is to present COs
with the opportunity (or burden) of listening to operators vent. Some of what a CO hears he will agree with,
but cannot do much about. To what extent should he
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commiserate? To what extent is he better off keeping
his own counsel? Choices, again. Moreover, commanders face yet more choices when it comes to how
they should best represent their subordinates’ frustrations and concerns up the chain of command, since
this is another of their obligations.
An additional 21st-century complication is that
it is very difficult for commanders to make visits on
the sly or without advance notice. GEN Marshall may
have been able to urge his subordinate COs to roam
around unannounced.
Remembering his own experiences with the mud of
France during the first war, the chief of staff suggested
that commanders take road trips with no visible signs
of rank on their vehicles. Without preferential treatment, they would find out for themselves what conditions actually are and take proper steps for correction
of defects.64

However, this is extremely difficult if not impossible to do today when the only way in or out of most
locations is by helicopter and security conditions are
semi-permissive at best.
As for what pre-announced visits in Afghanistan
(and Iraq) meant for those on the ground, operators
could—nay, had no choice but to—prepare in advance
for what to brief the visitor(s). Preparing to brief not
only took time away from other tasks, but also introduced artifice. Ask most operators and they would say
they would rather sit around and discuss, rather than
have to formally “brief,” what they know. Many also
wondered who was fooling whom, and why they had
to go through the motions; surely, a less formalized,
more honest discussion would work better. But again,
putting the best possible spin on the fleeting visits
commanders made is that while every team might
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think that it faced the most unique, difficult, interesting, or fill-in-the-blank challenges in the country, all of
them confronted problems that were variations on a
similar set of themes. What astute CJSOTF (and SOTF)
command teams could gauge by listening to a briefing was: are subordinate commanders (in Ridgway’s
terms) confident? Do they know what they are doing?
Do they know the terrain—and enough about the dynamics in their area of operations (AO)?
Because everyone is well schooled in how to brief,
and because officers are supposed to know how to
mentor and lead their men through briefings, briefings serve as yet another assessment device.
Operators were sometimes dismissive: what could
anyone possibly learn after only a short briefing and
quick tour? Or as one sergeant major (SGM) railed,
why should he care what the O-6 had to say when the
O-6 only bothered to visit for an hour; the O-6 should
spend a couple of days; he should go out on a patrol
or mission if he really wanted to understand what
the teams were experiencing. To which a Battalion
commander’s response was that the SGM was being
silly; teams have their own standard operating procedures (SOPs). Where would the SOTF or CJSOTF
commander fit in close quarter battle (CQB)? The idea
that anyone but actual operators (or enablers) should
go patrolling with the team reflected little more than
shortsightedness.
Interestingly, company commanders who themselves had recently been team leaders made a similar
point about higher-ranking commanders swooping in
for KLEs. In their view, these very important person
(VIP) visits seldom helped. Instead, it was captains
and their team members who needed to develop,
maintain, and be able to get something from relations
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they were cultivating with the locals. Whenever an
O-5, O-6, or O-7 flew in to meet with the local Afghan
Provincial Governor, that action undercut the O-3’s
authority.65 At times, it was extremely useful for the
O-3 to bring his Company or Battalion Commander to
a meeting. But this was usually under the guise of being able to say to the Provincial Governor or Chief of
Police: “I so value our relationship I wanted my CO to
be able to meet you” and/or when very specific leverage was needed.
In sum, commanders both got to—and had to—
make an endless number of decisions. For better
or worse, everything they did could wind up being
consequential. Some decisions were significant at
the time. Others proved consequential only in hindsight. Preventing negative repercussions required
discernment. It helped to be able to recoup from mistaken judgments quickly and/or to have the mental
agility to turn inadvertent mistakes to an advantage
somehow.
Fortunately, the military does an unparalleled job
of stair-stepping experience, and thus builds commanders’ ability to develop discernment. Ask capable
field grade officers how they and those above them
know what to do, and they answer that most of what
officers at their level do should be intuitive. Commanders just know—thanks to the fact that at every
level of command they have been given responsibility for the same three elements: money, equipment,
and people.66 With every echelon of command, they
simply acquire more of each across a broader span.
They also learn (or should learn) that they do not need
to know how to do their subordinates’ jobs; instead
they need to know what their subordinates should be
capable of, and they need to be able to determine how
much to trust them, how to motivate them, etc.
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When it works well, the ratcheted method by which
the military builds competence not only instills confidence, but the ineffable usefulness of how the military
does this should also underscore the structural significance of hierarchy.
However, developing good judgment depends on
more than just time spent moving through positions.
It also depends on the ability to read, vet, and assess
people and situations quickly and accurately. Moreover, it depends on individuals’ willingness to always
reevaluate their assessments.67
CASE IN POINT: AFGHANISTAN
At every level, one finds the same command challenge: how much does a commander need to know,
how much can or should he rely on others—and for
what? Meanwhile, the “who should convey what to
whom” question can be addressed in one of three
ways:
1. By focusing on the whos—who is transmitting,
who is receiving, and so on;
2. By focusing on the means of conveyance—e.g.
via visits, video teleconferences (VTCs), emails,
etc.; or,
3. By focusing on the what—the content of what
is being transmitted.
At first glance, it might seem that what a commander needs to know should be dictated by, and be
congruent with, geography and his span of control.
However, when war is objectiveless, spans of control
are hard to delineate. Indeterminacy is further compounded by multiple chains of command and other
forms of churn.68
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Two specific sources of tension co-exist. There is
the tension that Eitan Shamir describes: “an inherent
tension exists between the virtual world of the operational commander who constructs the frame and the
physical world of the tactical commander who utilizes
it,” though this is a tension at least as old as command
from a distance, and is something that clear communication helps mitigate.69 The second tension is more
idiosyncratic. It can be thought of as the difference
between “knowledge in your head” and “knowledge
in the world,” with the former referring “to skills and
facts that you must recall from memory, and the latter represent[ing] information that can be made easily
available by the system you are operating.”70 Although
this “knowledge in your head” and “knowledge in the
world” distinction comes from the world of databases
and the mechanics of sharing and retrieving information, it can be used to also describe the fidelity of information—information that is only as reliable as who it
comes from; or, in the case of Afghanistan (and Iraq),
who it comes through, since the source and the translator often represent two additional filters.
Reading Other People (Americans).
“The best leaders I’ve seen have an uncanny ability to understand, empathize, and communicate with
those they lead. . . . Great leaders intuitively sense, or
simply ask, how people feel and what resonates with
them.”71 Here GEN McChrystal is describing what
some refer to as emotional intelligence (EI), an ability or skill that has recently attracted considerable
military attention.72 Yet interestingly, one thing EI
tilts against is the very thing command requires: judgment. EI calls for people to suspend judgment.73 Yet,
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discerning and then deciding how much trust to place
in someone else’s abilities and sensibilities is imperative for command.
Indeed, GEN McChrystal indicates as much when
he comments that, “colorful, charismatic characters
often fascinate people, even soldiers. But over time,
effectiveness is what counts.”74 In other words, if you
are not careful, it is easy to be fooled by powerful, yet
superficial presentations of self.
Commanders are particularly prone. Here is why:
the support system for those in command is designed
to maximize their use of time. Attentive staffs do whatever is necessary to free up as much of a CO’s time as
possible, all with the aim of facilitating his decisionmaking. For instance, at the CJSOTF and even at SOTF
levels in Afghanistan (and Iraq), COs did not have the
same long waits for aircraft as subordinates did, and
often had aircraft at their disposal. Their staffs also
made all of their otherwise painful logistical co-ordinations for them.
Good staffs, meanwhile, were comprised of those
who wanted to do this. The ideal synergy was that
staff members anticipated the CO’s needs and the CO
appreciated their efforts. But this could also be distorting since with rank comes deference, and too much
deference has the potential to turn anyone’s head.
Deference up the chain can also mask character
traits in subordinate commanders that are visible to
others, but not to a CO. After all, from a CO’s perspective, prized traits in subordinate commanders include
conviction, confidence, and decisiveness, along with
being smart and displaying good judgment. However,
these very same traits are sometimes the hallmarks of
arrogance—something that peers and others notice,
but that ambitious, capable officers’ immediate supe-
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riors have little reason to notice. If a commander does
not take the time or know how to read how his subordinates are reading one another, he misses this.75
Yes, trusted staff members can often speak useful
truth to power. They can offer correctives and serve as
repositories of reliable memory. But not even trusted
subordinates can always fully speak their minds. At
the same time, those closest to a commander are subject to being shaped in ways they are not always aware
simply by being with the commander so much. For
instance, COs I shadowed had little choice but to continually repeat themselves across multiple meetings,
visits, and VTCs, which meant that close staff heard
them say the same things over and over. Whether staff
agreed or not, the conditioning over time became subliminal.
Assessing the Situation: Managing Information.
Other inadvertent distortions came with the sheer
volume of the information flow. Because there was always too much information for any one individual to
fully take in, the flood meant a lot always needed to
be edited out.76
Because there were not enough hours in the day
to read everything that should be read, commanders
needed to rely on others to do their reading—and editing—for them. Take situation reports (SITREPS) for
example. In Afghanistan, these were submitted daily
from every echelon of command. That turned their
production into a routine and, for many, a chore. Some
commanders took minimal interest in writing or editing SITREPS. Others viewed them as an opportunity
to set themselves apart and/or as a means to shape
“Higher’s” view.77
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In the same way that not everyone invested the
same amount of effort in writing or editing SITREPS,
those tasked with monitoring events for the CO (when
he was asleep, in transit, etc.) could miss or overlook
minor but still significant developments.
Triage was inescapable. But what might have led
some staff to also be a bit too cavalier with what they
did or did not think important enough to cull and
then convey was their tacit assumption that, really,
anyone could pull whatever information was needed
from someone, somewhere, if and when it was truly
needed.78
But—was such an assumption correct? One problem with electronic information that everyone “knows”
is easily retrievable is that smart people self-censor;
they purposely leave out whatever they do not want
becoming part of the permanent, retrievable record.
There is nothing particularly new about this. However, depending on who is (or is not) on a distribution
list, information also does not flow quite as smoothly
or as openly as is assumed. A third problem is that
the rampant use of email can short-circuit whatever
might be gained by instead having to have an actual
conversation, whether in person or by phone.79
However, perhaps the most significant drawback
to the ceaseless flow of electrons (apart from the extent to which electrons tether everyone to computer
screens) is that the volume itself can help convince
commanders that they really do have a “feel.” In some
ways this, too, is nothing new, since as Herman Wouk
wrote of Leyte Gulf during World War II:
So far had the art of communication advanced, so
powerful were the transmitters, so swift the coding, so
deliberate the movements of fleets traversing long dis-
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tances at twenty or twenty-five miles an hour, that the
far-off high commands could watch this entire battle
like Homeric gods hovering overhead, or like Napoleon on a hill at Austerlitz. The Battle of Leyte Gulf
was not only the biggest sea fight of all time, it was
unique in having all these distant spectators; unique,
too, in the flood of on-the-spot facts pouring out of
transmitters and cryptographic machines.
It is interesting, therefore, that nobody on the scene, or
anywhere else in the world, really knew what the hell
was going on. There never was a denser fog of war.
All the sophisticated communication only spread and
thickened it.80

Or, as one CO in Afghanistan put it, “tactical GOs
can’t see all the terrain. ‘Why aren’t you going over
there?’ Well sir, there’s a cliff you can’t see.”
Again, none of this is particularly novel. Tom
Ricks, for instance, quotes a Vietnam-era general who
noted that:
In Vietnam many low-level commanders were subject
to a hornet’s nest of helicopters carrying higher commanders calling for information, offering advice, making unwanted decisions and generally interfering with
what squad leaders and platoon leaders and company
commanders were trying to do.81

Nevertheless, one by-product of the military’s everimproving ability to monitor itself is the sense that
micro-management has intensified. So, too, has the
hustling of expertise.
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Vetting Others: Expertise.
Who has actual expertise, who doesn’t, and in
what exactly looms especially large given the degree
to which CGs have increasingly come to rely on outside experts for advice, and sometimes for cover.82
Tom Ricks suggests that:
the addition of SAMS [School of Advanced Military
Studies] graduates to the ranks of lieutenant colonels
and colonels may have reinforced the trend among
generals toward tactical orientation, by making the senior officers believe—falsely—that they did not need
to think and read deeply about their profession, because the Army was producing officers who could do
that for them.83

As Ricks goes on to write:
It is not difficult to find experienced officers who are
uneasy with how today’s generals operate. ‘They have
somewhat abdicated their role in developing their intent or guidance, their vision,’ concluded Army Col.
Dale Eikmeier, who served as a strategic planner in
Iraq. ‘They’ve subcontracted that out to staff officers to
come up with an intent or guidance for them.’84

But, as Fred Kaplan makes clear in The Insurgents,
GOs haven’t just restricted themselves to advice from
uniformed advisors.85 As he notes of GEN Odierno,
“wherever Odierno went . . . he brought [Emma] Sky
along. . . . Odierno was once asked by a fellow general
officer what he got from her. He replied, she helps me
with the why.”86
At least Emma Sky had prior familiarity with the
Middle East. The same cannot be said for many other
experts who might claim expertise about counter48

insurgency (COIN) or counterterrorism (CT), but
who, prior to 9/11, had never previously spent time
on their own in Afghanistan (or Iraq), and spoke no
local language.87
Among the dangers that inhere in commanders’
growing reliance on others for regional expertise is
that without having familiarity with the topic, subject,
or area themselves, how are they supposed to be able
to gauge how expert any “expert” really is?88
By way of example, I sat through one battalion
level briefing about local tribal dynamics. The individuals doing the speaking knew the material: names,
place names, tribal connections, the broad pattern of
population movements, and so on; they clearly had
mastered the facts. But theirs was a mechanistic mastery, as if once they had been told which interactions
to focus on they were smart enough to collect and
assemble that data. Yet, there was no indication that
they could see any dynamics beyond those they had
been asked to follow. No matter how much new data
they might gather, it was clear they did not intuitively
grasp the nature of Afghan (or tribal) politicking.
While these three briefers were more knowledgeable than their peers, and earned their peers’ respect
as a consequence, at least their peers did not unduly
defer to them; their advice was not going to be sought
on matters beyond what they had been tasked to pay
attention to. In contrast, credentialed outside experts
brought in to Afghanistan (or Iraq) were often asked
for advice well beyond whatever firsthand knowledge they might possess. Since “subject matter experts” were just as prone to the seductions that come
with deference as anyone in uniform—and maybe
even more so when senior military commanders were
soliciting their opinion—how many could then resist
straying beyond what they actually did know?
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The economy of prestige deeply affected access to
top commanders and vice versa. For instance, once
someone reached a dominant position as an advisor,
they typically stayed there since, if GENs X, Y, and
Z made use of them, they were clearly presumed to
know their stuff. It is quite possible that such individuals did provide the best possible advice. But another dynamic was also generally at work: those who
allowed themselves to be considered “experts” also
tended to be gifted at being able to read what GENs
thought they needed to learn.
In fairness, and as this Letort Paper has tried to describe, commanders at all levels were always strapped
for time. It thus made sense for them to rely on those
who could cut to the chase with confidence to include
which linguists and cultural advisors that CGs, especially, listened to.89 The more Westernized an interpreter and/or cultural advisor was, the easier they
were for CGs (or for anyone Western) to understand,
and the better these particular Afghans appeared to
be at cross-cultural translation.90 However, as less adept seeming interpreters liked to point out, fluency in
educated English typically meant an individual had
spent considerable time outside of Afghanistan. Often, but not always, this signaled (to anyone paying
attention) that they were probably not as plugged into
local politics as someone with deeper local ties, but a
broken accent.
Because money and prestige flowed from having
the commander’s ear, from traveling with the commander, etc., interpreters/cultural advisors became
more than just proprietary about access—they became
de facto gatekeepers.
In many regards, such dependencies were unavoidable.91 Nor were all of them detrimental.
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For instance, it was extraordinarily illuminating
to travel with one CJSOTF commander who had an
extremely close relationship with his cultural advisor
who he also used as his interpreter. Together, they
spent their time visiting Afghans, leaving it to the
CO’s command team to make the types of command
and BFC visits described earlier.92
In fact, the way this particular CO (whom I’ll call
CO X) checked up on how well or how poorly his subordinate commanders were performing was to ask
the Afghans he visited for their assessment. In many
regards, this was the perspective every SF CO should
have sought. However, few had the contacts CO X
did, or, quite frankly, the desire to visit Afghans every day. Nor could anyone have developed the same
relations he had—and certainly not over the course of
just one or two rotations. Instead, to do what he did
required having been in Afghanistan at the outset of
the war, returning over and over to the same area, and
having a cultural advisor who would keep him wellinformed during those times when he was away from
Afghanistan.
By 2013 or 2014, it was too late to build either the
reputation or the connections necessary to operate the
way CO X did, but CO X was rare for an additional
reason: he genuinely enjoyed tending to his network,
and behaved quite atypically for someone of his rank.
For example, when meeting with Afghans, CO X
would speak little, ask occasional “tell us what you
think” questions, offer encouragement rather than direct advice, nod frequently, and demonstrate engagement by thoughtfully plucking raisins or nuts slowly,
one by one, from the tray in front of him (platters of
nuts and raisins being as ubiquitous as cups of tea). CO
X’s body language was always relaxed. Yet through-
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out, he was poised, ready to offer an expeditious favor
as soon as he determined the moment (and the favor)
was right. Sometimes this might involve arranging
medical care for someone who was sick or hurt; sometimes it meant promising that his Civil Affairs teams
would deliver humanitarian assistance. The key was
to always offer something tangible and never leave a
meeting without having promised a favor that could
be delivered within a few days. This is how he banked
goodwill. His subtext was: “I did for you; you know I
did for you. You know I can. You know I will. So, take
care of my guys.”
By promising to deliver only what he knew he
could, CO X set himself apart from other Americans
in Afghan eyes while, from his perspective, every favor he could do bought his operators that much more
freedom of maneuver.93 To accomplish this, though,
required that he travel non-stop. He also had to make
frequent return visits to lots of people—both to remind them that he had done them favors, and to remind them that he was poised to do them more.
Thanks to this non-stop circulation, CO X was able
to traffic in, correct, and, to a certain extent, control
information. By alluding to what other Afghans had
told him, or who he was visiting next, he let Afghan
generals, politicians, warlords, and former warlords
know just how many other Afghans he was visiting,
which made everyone he visited want to then keep
him in their loop, too.
The fact that CO X’s cultural advisor, Z, was integral to setting up these meetings and to translating
during them granted CO X further latitude to be reflective rather than reactive over the course of a conversation. Because Z was with CO X all the time, CO X
knew he could count on Z to remember who had said
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what about whom. Between them, they could thus
adjust whatever they thought they knew according to
what they learned since they were continually gleaning new information. In CO X’s view, “every time you
think you’ve got something figured out, along comes
something that proves you don’t. Some things we just
don’t understand. We have to find the Afghans who
do.”94
Did CO X end up being too dependent on Z? Perhaps. But unless or until an American commander
can be both linguistically and culturally fluent and
plugged into formal and informal power flows on his
own, it is hard to conceive of an alternative—which is
why being able to accurately assess not only Americans is a critical skill.95
Assessing the Situation: Understanding Politics.
What CO X managed to do at the national level,
astute operators and officers tried to do at the district
and provincial levels. Good teams did round robins of
KLEs and used these and other methods of collecting
information to try to keep up with the pick-up sticks
nature of Afghan politics.
As one GO described Afghanistan in 2014, it was a
“tactical mosaic.”96 Or as another commander with extensive Iraq experience reflected, “Unlike Iraq, everything is so local that it isn’t possible to find a lever to
turn that can shift the whole thing—or a critical mass.
There is no whole thing or critical mass.”97
Although SF soldiers have long been lauded for
their linguistic and regional expertise, SF’s actual skill
in Afghanistan (and Iraq) did not lie in either linguistic
or cultural fluency. Instead, it rested in teams’ abilities
to stitch together entities that had not previously and
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might not otherwise work together, thereby enabling
the sum of the parts to act as a more effective whole
than would otherwise be possible.
Arguably, the challenge Afghanistan posed to SOF
teams was that they could never find or create enough
effective and/or trustworthy Afghan partners. Here,
fluency in Pashtu or Dari or deeper local familiarity
would not have helped. No question, knowledgeable
Afghan hands had a considerable head start when it
came to understanding intra-Afghan dynamics. But
astute commanders were surprisingly effective at inspiring some analysts and operators to want to figure
out who, as in which Afghans, within their AO, could
do what to whom—when, where, and with what.
As one Battalion commander put it, he did not
want his teams to try to get a District Chief of Police or
other political appointee removed simply because that
individual was hard to work with or no good. Instead,
he wanted his teams to figure out why that individual
had been appointed in the first place, and by whom;
who benefited from his being there? As this CO explained, incompetents might be kept in office because
that permitted local power brokers to continue to do
as they pleased; sometimes weak individuals were
emplaced because someone (or multiple someones)
needed a person in that position to be weak.
This particular CO did his best to get his subordinates to think in terms of predictive analysis—and to
appreciate the fact that Karzai and those around him
exhibited clear political genius. For instance, whenever Karzai put an individual into a position of power,
he set the conditions to ensure a rival could undercut
or contest that power. It was therefore up to the Battalion to study the entire suite of changes that were made
whenever a personnel change occurred—to include
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in areas outside their AO; looking at just a single political appointment never revealed enough, not when
Karzai’s method was to position and reposition everyone so that he could retain sufficient leverage over just
enough people.98
Thinking in these terms came naturally to some
commanders, and to some of their operators and analysts. Others got it once it was explained. But for yet
others, the nature of Afghan politics was not the least
bit logical. They therefore needed to be talked through
the multiple “if . . . then” steps required to get from “if
we can divert, interrupt, or stop the flow of patronage,
goods, or services from this particular powerbroker
over here, then that will do X, Y, and Z to these other
powerbrokers over there.”
Meanwhile, the fact that at least some SF commanders could appreciate the nature of Afghan-style politics, and could do so on their first deployment without
speaking either Dari or Pashtu, should turn one piece
of accepted wisdom on its head: being steeped in the
local language and culture may not be as necessary
for assessing foreign situations as has been assumed.99
Instead, affinity (and developing a “feel for”) may be
far more important than “expertise,” which often only
consists of a command over information.
Complicating Factors.
Some might contend that anything the U.S. military
sought to do in Afghanistan would have generated an
inherently wicked problem given the neighborhood,
the local culture, tribal politics, etc. Elsewhere I have
written about the problems that arise when there is no
Declaration of War, and in the “OVERVIEW” of this
Letort Paper I cited issues associated with a lack of
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objectives.100 But certainly, fighting by coalition introduced a further set of complications, especially when
troop-contributing countries each pursued different
agendas (and strategies) and brought with them different caveats about what their soldiers could and
could not do.
Coordination and deconfliction with ISAF forces
absorbed considerable command time, energy, and
manpower.101 So did working with interagency partners, conventional U.S. forces, and others. Contending
with so many different players required continual adjustments and readjustments, especially as units—and
augmentees—rotated in and out of theater on separate
schedules. Endless churn inspired everything from
apathy on the part of some, to an almost frantic need
by others to make their mark, especially if they were
on what might be their one and only combat rotation.
Consequently, there were a host of legitimate (and not
just self-interested) reasons for different component
commanders and their staffs to try to influence, manipulate, or pitch, persuade, and out-pitch each other.
The fact that some referred to what went on as “stakeholder fratricide” should speak volumes.
One unfortunate source of parochialism was
(again) that too many individuals had too little to
do beyond focus on work that consisted of sitting in
front of computer screens. Literally, and not just figuratively, this reinforced myopia. At the same time,
there were so many different entities spread across
the country and/or housed in their own camps on
larger bases that mixing across United States, never
mind ISAF forces, was minimal.102 Self-segregation
then made it that much easier for people to fixate on
and pursue their own agendas, particularly when
they regarded Afghanistan as a giant training area or
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opportunity—an ideal place to test equipment,
improve SOPs, and acquire critical combat skills.
While some, or indeed most, participants and/
or observers might attribute Coalition disarray to
the lack of an overarching strategy, my contention
is that without a singular hierarchy no leader could
have afforded to “let 100 arguments/Courses of Actions bloom” and expect anything of lasting value to
emerge.
Or, to rephrase this: it is important but incomplete
to think that simply developing a coherent strategy is
all that will be required to do better in the future. This
is because developing is too easy; smart staffs excel at
being able to develop and produce smart papers. Take,
for instance, GEN Dempsey’s “Mission Command”
White Paper. It is full of clever writing and compellingsounding sentences. For example, “Tempo is our ability to operate at the speed of the problem.” But—what
exactly does this mean?103
Or, “The global application of integrated, discriminate military power in all domains calls for us
to organize and conduct networked operations, where
any force element can support or be supported by any
other.”104 Which employs a lot of buzzwords, but who
exactly bears the responsibility for orchestrating this?
Or, “Subordinate echelons must be allowed to own
their own ‘white space’”—which leaves unexplained
how far white space might extend or the extent to
which those who own their own white space would
also get to control their own assets (consisting of what,
we don’t know).105
On the face of it, it is hard to argue with the sentiment behind Mission Command. But try to figure out
how to operationalize what GEN Dempsey’s White
Paper describes and the tenets begin to feel more like
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platitudes than anything practicable. For instance,
what kind of structure is needed for Mission Command to be executed as the Army conceives it? And
does such a structure currently exist?
The honest answer is probably “not quite.” Certainly, no such structure existed in Afghanistan (or
Iraq). Nor can or will a war-winning structure exist without first returning to first principles about
hierarchy.
SINGULAR HIERARCHY + OWNERSHIP
The gist of the argument to be presented in this section is that a firm, clear hierarchy is essential to pursue
any military endeavor effectively.106 Corollary to this
is that whoever is in charge also needs to know he will
“own” his problem (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS], etc.) until he has resolved
it or until he is removed on the unlikely chance that
the objectives he sets he cannot meet.107
“Singular hierarchy” shouldn’t, but probably
would, require a serious reexamination of civilmilitary relations—a topic to which this Letort Paper will return in passing in the section “FURTHER
THOUGHTS AND OTHER APPROACHES.” The
aim here is to simply suggest that there may be more
than just a correlation to the fact that big egos clashed
during World War II, but with GEN Marshall in command, his “team of rivals” was able to successfully
define objectives and defeat the enemy.108
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Ethnographic Truths—Part 2.
In Command Culture, Jörg Muth writes that:
The sharpest and most devastating weapon the U.S.
Army could possess today in the War against Terror
is not a new computer system, a sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicle, or a smart artillery shell; it is
rather a carefully selected, aggressive hard-core Battalion or brigade commander who was exposed to a
large dose of military history, is trusted by his superiors to conduct his own operations, and oversees them
wherever the bullets fly.109

I would add to Muth’s formulation that a commander
should also be able to read people, vet information,
and assess situations—and, I would submit, know
something about the adversary.
It is also hard to disagree with Muth when he
writes that the U.S. military has a distinct weakness
for technology. But—what about its penchant to train,
to practice, to improve, and to train some more?110 The
U.S. military’s drive to conduct after action reviews
and then re-set is a key strength which has nothing
to do with technology per se, but helps explain why,
before Rangers conduct something like a night Company Live Fire exercise, they conduct days’ worth
of practice runs, and a week’s worth of platoon live
fires (conducted day and night). It is also why the Battalion commander will participate in every hotwash
with every platoon after every iteration—to model the
ethos that performance can always be tweaked and
improved, and total commitment matters.
Another core U.S. military strength lies in the layering of effects. Consider, for example, how SF teams
prepare to train foreign forces. Teams determine what

59

needs to be achieved (both from the U.S. and the host
nation’s perspectives), then work backwards to build
into the plan of instruction (POI) how they want the
training to “build,” with the proviso that training
should always teach more than just “shoot, move,
and communicate” skills. It should reinforce for foreign forces the value of wanting to conduct training,
and should instill an appreciation for why planning
to do training and why attending to logistical details
matters.111
If design and attention to logistical detail are one
clear upside to the American military personality, the
relentless drive to make things better is another. Units
will tweak or fix and re-engineer anything they can.
Nothing showcases this better than the robust supply, communications, and logistics systems erected in
two broken countries—Afghanistan and Iraq—half a
world away from the continental United States.
However, the downside to the American propensity to engineer is that while certain kinds of processes
lend themselves to continual improvement, others do
not. Certain things about humans cannot be re-engineered. Instead, they need to be accommodated and
used.112 This brings me to hierarchy.
Hierarchy.
Humans are status-seeking social animals. By definition, status contests upset the status quo—if not permanently, then temporarily. In conditions of extreme
flux or turmoil, people will turn to whoever or whatever they think they can rely on: a leader, elders, the
state, or some entity that they hope will take charge to
protect them and restore order.113
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The clearest evidence that these observations hold
true cross-culturally, and therefore describe an inescapable dimension of the human condition, is the
fact that status competitions can be found under all
systems of governance and in all types of society.114
Pecking orders emerge in every kind of group setting—in prisons, on juries, and among hostages. In
some cases, hierarchies are formalized, which means
they are fixed—and whoever is in charge will remain
in charge until the rules or someone else successfully
says otherwise. In other instances, leadership is impermanent, and whom people look up to depends on
which skilled individual they need to turn to at the
time (e.g. a master hunter, healer, elder, etc.). Clear,
too, is that the human default is to only defer to those
whom you want or must defer to; to avoid those you
don’t want to defer to (if you can); and to elicit deference (should you choose to) from those who rank
beneath you.
We see these principles at work especially vividly
during wartime among soldiers who want to follow
leaders who know what they are doing; who project
confidence, courage, and vision; who have integrity;
and who are fair, principled, and also consistent, in
the sense that followers, peers, and superiors always
know where they stand with them.115
In the popular imagination, hierarchy might seem
to imply that everyone is always striving for dominance all of the time. But reality belies this since one
effect of hierarchy is to establish order and reinforce
orderliness. Or as Alison Fragale, who studies organizational behavior, once told a Wall Street Journal reporter, “For all the egalitarian talk, people really like
hierarchy. It is extremely functional in order to complete tasks. Without a leader, a lot of time is wasted
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with mutual deference but eventually a hierarchy will
form.”116
Or, as Jeffrey Pfeffer puts it:
hierarchy is a fundamental structural principle of all
organizational systems . . . hierarchy is not only a general feature of many if not most systems, but, in fact,
makes complexity—including complex, coordinated
social and physical arrangements—possible.117

For thousands of years, militaries have made productive use of hierarchy; what makes an up-or-out
system like that of the U.S. military so interesting is
that it manages to stoke competition within while
simultaneously freezing direct contestation. Indeed,
one of the strongest arguments made on behalf of hierarchy lurks in one of GEN McChrystal’s comments
about leadership, which, at the end of a long career,
he still considers to be the sine qua non of organizational success. In My Share of the Task, McChrystal describes what he used to tell junior leaders in the 82nd
Airborne Division:
Switch just two people—the Battalion commander
and command sergeant major [CSM]—from the best
Battalion with those of the worst, and within ninety
days the relative effectiveness of the Battalions will
have switched as well.118

What is telling about this example is whom GEN
McChrystal chooses to switch out: the Battalion commander and CSM. In doing so, he has not chosen just
any two people. Instead, he has chosen individuals at
the top of their respective hierarchies.
To be sure, no one today has suggested that the
military abandon hierarchy. But there are suggestions

62

that it should be flattened. Even former GOs like GEN
McChrystal argue that more should be made of networks, as if networks are capable of commanding or
controlling anything.119
My research—and his example, actually, as a leader who his subordinates wanted to follow—suggest
the opposite. To wage war effectively, the military not
only needs a hierarchy, but it needs a singular hierarchy to prosecute the war. Otherwise, the competition among hierarchies—that is rampant today—will
continue to do a disservice to those commanders who
expect their commanders to be able to command.
Singular Hierarchy.
In Transforming Command, Eitan Shamir notes that,
“Although military organizations rely on a centralized, narrow span of control that creates tall structures, they are becoming increasingly differentiated
due to the increasing number of specialized units.”120
This leads Shamir to conclude that with more specialization, more coordination will be required. However,
we should wonder, is coordination sufficient?
For GEN George C. Marshall 70+ years ago, the
answer was a resolute “no.”
‘I am convinced,’ the army chief of staff told the officers assembled in the crowded conference room on
December 26 [1941] ‘that there must be one man in
command of the entire theater—air, ground and ships.
We cannot manage by cooperation. Human frailties
are such that there would be emphatic unwillingness
to place portions of troops under another service. If
we can make a plan for unified command now, it will
solve nine-tenths of our troubles.’121
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Or, same war, different perspective:
The core of Franklin Roosevelt’s malignant military
genius lay in these simple rules: to pick generals and
admirals with care, to leave strategy and tactics to
them, and attend only to the politics of the war; never
to interfere in operations; never to relieve leaders who
encountered honorable reverses; and to allow all the
glory to those who won victories. When Roosevelt
died, the supreme command in the field was virtually the original team. This steadiness paid dividends.
Shake-ups in military command can cost much momentum, élan, and fighting effectiveness. The shuffling of generals by Hitler was our plague.122

Among the many things singular hierarchy would
demand and enable is vision, as well as unity of command and effort.
With a singular hierarchy, there would be no room
for “indifference creep.” More significantly, the time
devoted to having to try to negotiate with fellowAmericans would be dramatically cut. As previously
mentioned, SF commanders in Afghanistan (and Iraq)
often found themselves having to work hard at relations with conventional battlespace owners whose
goodwill they needed so that their teams could conduct operations. When relations were tense or less
than amicable, SF commanders would joke that visits
to conventional commanders required utilization of
their unconventional warfare skills. However, even
when relations were good, SOF commanders and their
staffs still had to expend considerable effort on building and cementing rapport with fellow Americans.123
While there is every indication that collaboration
works best during a crisis (at least for as long as the
crisis lasts), peers are competitors. Consequently, in
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a collaborative environment, if someone does not
want to be forthcoming or does not want to assist,
who can make him? Contrast this with what would be
achieved if there were a singular hierarchy and a sole
commander, as well as a single overarching staff: now
someone (or a set of someones) would be responsible
for knowing what all components were up to. It would
also then be up to that command staff to delegate and
thereby keep parties de-conflicted.
Would having a singular hierarchy mitigate all
competition? Hardly, but if deliberative speed was
considered a necessity during World War II—“The
very speed of modern war demanded summary judgment, however harsh it was; Marshall had too little
time to agonize over decisions”124—then imagine the
costs that have been sunk in efforts made to coordinate
to collaborate today; this makes an absolute mockery
of deliberativeness.125
Of course, another consequential benefit to a singular hierarchy would be to eliminate seams that canny
adversaries learn to exploit.
Singular Hierarchy + Ownership.
As just described, one rationale for a singular hierarchy would be to enable everyone to cut to the chase
faster. A second is captured in the slogan, “one team,
one fight.” For as many times as one heard this line
in Afghanistan (and Iraq), in reality the only way to
make such a concept real is for the commander heading the effort to be given the opportunity to do so from
beginning to end. No retiring. No cashing in before
the war has been won.
Among the many pay-offs a “singular hierarchy
+ ownership” approach would yield is that the com-
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mander and his command team would have every
incentive to craft a strategy that: 1) could actually be
executed—particularly since they would be the ones
responsible for executing it; but 2) in such a way as
to get them back home in as little time as it takes to
complete the job, 3) with no prospect of their having to
return to finish the job at a later date. Even better, with
their reputation(s) on the line and with no ability to
cast blame elsewhere, the command team would have
little choice but to fully invest in all of the forces under
its command since these would now be its forces.
Ownership would not just recalibrate commitment
throughout the force (top-down, bottom-up, and laterally), but with greater continuity would come greater
familiarity—familiarity with the problem set, with the
adversary, with local allies, and among subordinate
units.
Continuity and familiarity would redound in numerous ways. Officers would no longer need to try
to sell themselves to “Higher” quite so relentlessly.
Nor would talented S-2s have to spend so much of
their time countering others’ intelligence reports and
analyses, which occurs whenever different shops look
through different soda straws, and when everyone
has a different conception of the mission and therefore
concentrates on different things.
As Antonio Giustozzi noted, one consequence of
the churn already underway in Afghanistan in 2007
was that “The actual impact of different strategies is
difficult to assess, not least because changes occurred
so frequently that there was no time for the outcome
of a particular approach to become obvious.”126 Similarly, it is hard to read David Cloud and Greg Jaffe’s
account about the four-starred generals who presided
over the effort in Iraq (Chiarelli, Casey, Abizaid, and
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Petraeus) and not question the assessment that GEN
Casey’s approach was doomed. Or that GEN Chiarelli’s approach was fatally flawed. Perhaps the problem
was less that either man was wrong than that neither
was granted sufficient time or command authority to
effect the strategy he thought most appropriate.
Consider, too, what churn permitted our putative
“host nation” allies to do. One could easily substitute
“Afghanistan” for “Iraq” in the following:
An Iraqi general once related how it was easy to handle a new American commander working on a 1-year
timeline. First, he said, you would decline to meet with
him, or simply not show up. Next, you could have a
series of sessions at which you resisted the changes he
was recommending. In the third phase, you would begin to agree but argue over implementation. Finally,
about 8 months into the talks, you would slowly begin
making his desired changes. By month 10, he noted,
the American commander’s focus would shift to his
impending redeployment, and the pressure was off.
Then, at month 13, the American commander’s successor would sit down for a cup of tea, and the cycle
would begin again.127

Of course, serial turnovers did not just work against
us with allies or adversaries. Churn also undermined
the confidence American troops should have been
able to place in their commanders.
Again, GEN McChrystal may reveal more than
he intends in the following passage (in which he describes a visit he made to a platoon in Zhari at the platoon leader’s invitation):
Any progress I could see from a wider view of Afghanistan was impossible to discern from their mud-walled
world. War has often been that way. Like leaders before
me, I was asking soldiers to believe in something their
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ground-level perspective denied them. I was asking
them to believe in a strategy impossible to guarantee,
and in progress that was hard to see, much less prove.
They were asked to risk themselves to bring improvements that might take years to arise. Although war is
a product and instrument of national policy, that reality feels distant and theoretical to the soldier leaning
exhausted against a mud wall. As a commander, I was
asking them to believe in me. Whether they did was
often hard to judge.128

However, the unasked question is: Why should
they have believed in GEN McChrystal when he was
just going to be one of a succession of generals placed
“in charge”?129
Other Issues.
Again, one reason some “one” needs to be in
charge is so that all those beneath him are clear on
where they belong in his pecking order and where
they belong vis-à-vis one another. Talk to GENs’ aides
and others who are privy to GO interactions. Many
find the jockeying and skirmishing they see GOs do
behind each other’s backs deeply troubling. Some attribute this to GO culture. Or, as I heard one senior
NCO say in Afghanistan:
officers have a coded, indirect way of talking to each
other in reference to their protégés. Even if someone
else’s protégés are thought to be no good, no one does
anything because payback will affect their protégés.
It’s all about building networks and protégés who will
protect and help make their COs’ reputation.130

There is a very deep irony in the fact that those
engaging in this kind of indirect gamesmanship do so
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on behalf of earning more stars so that they can be directive. Some see an institutional pathology at work in
GO behavior, and:
an organizational culture that discourages subordinate dissent or disagreement. Although high levels of
assertiveness are espoused in the Army, in practice,
neither the subordinate nor the leader typically expects direct, tough pushback to a leader’s thoughts or
ideas.131

But—if a leader were truly confident, why would he
fear dissent or disagreement?132 As for what would
lend a leader confidence, how about being sure of
his position and of the objectives? As for what might
serve as a check on arrogance, that could and should
be reputation.
Here is where I can begin to connect the dots. Under a “singular hierarchy + ownership” construct, the
war would belong, in reputation, to one man and his
staff. It is hard to imagine a heavier, more sobering
burden.133
Let me quickly mention two other things “singular
hierarchy + ownership” would mitigate before turning to my final contention that nothing is more likely
to promote or protect diversity of thought than “singular hierarchy + ownership.”
First, shortsightedness, as Bernd Horn has written:
Within the military there seems to be a lack of patience
and a perpetual rush to get things done ‘now’ . . . there
seems to be a plethora of false deadlines. As a result,
often the necessary intellectual rigour is absent. Good
enough to meet the remit becomes essential.134
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Unfortunately, expedience rewards shallow work.
Second, it also tends to reward it too soon. For instance,
as several writers have noted, GEN Petraeus courted
fame, or at least renown, long before he became a GO.
According to David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, after only 3
months in Haiti, Petraeus co-authored an article, “triumphantly titled ‘Winning the Peace’,” in which he:
argued that ‘in detail of planning and degree of coordination the effort to stand Haiti back up after taking it
down broke new ground. . . . An environment conducive
to political, social and economic development has been
created in Haiti.’135

Cloud and Jaffe characterize this as an “exuberant
overstatement,” particularly since Petraeus’s “threemonth tour was not enough time to make any lasting
improvements, and when the last U.S. troops left the
island a year after Petraeus, conditions rapidly deteriorated.”136
But expedience encourages careerists to fudge in
other ways as well. For example, Tom Ricks describes
and then cites from a report commissioned by GEN
Westmoreland after the My Lai massacre, which:
pointed toward a new model of officer that was emerging . . . “an ambitious, transitory commander—marginally skilled in the complexity of his duties—engulfed
in producing statistical results, fearful of personal
failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic
reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety
of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of
his subordinates.”137

Careerism did not start in Vietnam, as Ricks notes,
and as anyone who has read Anton Myrer’s saga, Once
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An Eagle, knows. One change that is noticeable since
Myrer’s day, however, is the non-maturing effects of
combat. Let me explain. The anthropological term for
being suspended in a zone where normal rules do
not apply is liminality. What liminality is supposed
to do is move individuals from the state they were in
to a different, more mature stage of life. Sadly, this
does not describe what the past decade and a half has
wrought for many veterans, who have been subject to
the moral wear and tear of having to build rapport
with bad or questionable allies over the course of multiple Groundhog Day-like rotations.138
At the best of times, a certain romance attaches to
being able to skirt the law and break the rules, which is
what working with warlords and corrupt power brokers in Afghanistan both required and enabled. “Dealing in the gray,” as operators call it, is seductive. Case
in point, again: Jim Gant who, as some who knew him
are quick to point out, did not really operate all that
differently from other team leaders (though some of
his infractions were more egregious).
Combine “dealing in the gray” with a lack of objectives, however, and corrosiveness is bound to set
in. For instance, upon turning over team command in
2004, Gant told his team: “We will never win in Afghanistan. . . . But know—now and always—that does
not matter. That is an irrelevant fact. It gives us a place
to go and fight, it gives us a place to go and be warriors. That’s it.”139 Several years later, after still more
time spent in Afghanistan, Ann Scott Tyson concedes
(or boasts) that “Jim was fighting not for his country
but for his family, his men, and his tribe.”140
There is no way to know whether a “singular hierarchy + ownership” rubric might have prevented
the torquing of someone like Jim Gant. But under a
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“singular hierarchy + ownership” rubric it is hard to
imagine that someone like him would have shot to
rockstar status in quite the way he did, or would have
been permitted—nay, enabled—to break as many
laws as he did. Certainly, at a minimum, he would
have known why he was fighting.141
Here is where, again, GEN McChrystal is revealing
as he points out that sound mental health depends on
knowing you can count on certain things. For instance,
the philosophy he applied at Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC): “Our discipline of schedules, processes, and standards did not reduce adaptability or
creativity. It was the foundation that allowed for it.”142
Or consider the example described earlier: life on
forward operating bases (FOBs) freed soldiers to do
nothing but concentrate on work. Classically, the military goes to extraordinary lengths to try to take care of
soldiers’ physical (and, today, family readiness) needs.
Yet, curiously, over the course of the past decade and
a half it has not provided those it is grooming for command with the type of leadership they most need. It
has not optimized the one thing it always has as its
disposal. Instead, it has made a hash of hierarchy.
Variation.
Despite what many assert, being able to master the
complexities of 21st-century warfare, as it ricochets
among tribal shatter zones and as it gives rise to “little
green men,” does not require that every or even most
officers acquire master’s degrees, let alone a doctorate.
Instead, the breadth and depth that future COs need
requires a certain turn of mind first and foremost.
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As James Q. Wilson put it several decades ago:
a major responsibility of an executive is not only . . . to
infuse the organization with value, it is also to discover a way by which different values (and the different
cultures that espouse those values) can productively
coexist.143

Or, from what I have seen, what commanders most
need to be able to do is to read people, vet information, assess situations, value variation, and judge
worth accurately.
Appreciating how to best take advantage of variation within the force is critically important. Otherwise,
as Jeffrey Pfeffer has written: “The ego-based bias in
favor of those who look, act, or in other ways remind
people of themselves makes eliminating discrimination in organizational career processes both difficult
and unlikely.144 Or, as Tim Kane notes: “All of the
services use processes for designating, distributing,
evaluating, and promoting their human capital that
are designed not to value heterogeneous talent [italics
in original].”145
Today, diversity has come to mean two of this color, three from that heritage, or four soldiers who are
transgendered. Yet, the heterogeneity commanders
most need is in mental aptitude and affinities.146 Unfortunately, until diversity in mental agility receives
more sustained attention and is emphasized, the easy
fallback will likely remain superficial variation.
To be sure, seeking, encouraging, and protecting subordinates who have a penchant for solving
problems differently poses its own set of command
challenges. Also, no matter how important it is for
commanders to learn to appreciate variation, “appreciation” alone will prove insufficient.147 This is
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because a true “democracy of ideas” is never possible when there are multiple hierarchies. With multiple hierarchies, too many individuals compete at the
highest levels. That competition in turn leads to too
many turf battles and too much tribalism. Lineages of
acolytes themselves begin to compete. Worse may
be the underside of competition: risk aversion—with
ideas especially.
Or to come at this from a slightly different angle,
consider what a “singular hierarchy + ownership” rubric should make possible. First, the (not a, but the) CG
would gain nothing if he could not craft and execute
a war-winning strategy. Instead, he would only stand
to lose—the commander in chief’s confidence, reputation, everything. Imagine if he then knew that he
had numerous subordinates who thought differently
enough from him that he could be sure they wouldn’t
just generate as many different courses of action as
possible, but would also constructively sharp shoot
each other, and him. Under the “one team/one fight”
and ownership-for-the-duration rubric, his staff and
his subordinate commanders would be responsible
for identifying achievable objectives. Under this rubric, only the problem set—the nature of the adversary and what would be required to attain a decisive
win—would determine the parameters of the thinkable, not whatever anyone might second-guess his
preferences to be.
Of course, it is always possible that a CG with this
much leeway might still surround himself with subordinates who would have their own reasons for letting (or leading) him to believe he is smarter than they
are, and so always knows best—to which the obvious
corrective would be: commanders should only ever
be chosen wisely. GEN Marshall, for example, did not
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succumb. However, the fact that generals under him
did suggests that some additional checks would be
required.148
FURTHER THOUGHTS AND OTHER
APPROACHES
As James Q. Wilson writes in Bureaucracy:
All complex organizations display bureaucratic problems of confusion, red tape, and the avoidance of responsibility. These problems are much greater in government bureaucracies because government itself is
the institutionalization of confusion (arising out of the
need to moderate competing demands); of red tape
(arising out of the need to satisfy demands that cannot
be moderated); and of avoided responsibility (arising
out of the desire to retain power by minimizing criticism).149

This seems an apt description for what many O-4s,
O-5s, and O-6s (and others) have experienced over the
past 15 years, something that, in theory, a “singular
hierarchy + ownership” approach should obviate. As
for the one dimension that Wilson did not consider—
time—the rubric should actually help with this, too.
The military could exert more control over time
than it does. However, it cannot do so when, as we
have seen, there is a continual pull for information
from the field, or when commanders do not feel they
can afford to step back and fully digest the information that bombards them. This especially troubles
some senior NCOs who want officers to be able to
think big and reflect; in their view, this is what commanders exist to do.
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Meanwhile, because time in command is so compressed, officers only get so many chances to make no
mistakes and to make their mark. Or, to return to the
glass ball/rubber ball analogy: if there isn’t much an
O-4, O-5, or O-6 commander can do during his one
8-month rotation except to try to avoid mistakes, why
should he treat the war as a glass ball and his career as
a rubber ball? He has every incentive instead to treat
his career as the glass ball, and the war as something
he can dribble to his successor.
Limited command time also makes it extremely
difficult to be creative. At the tactical and operational
levels, bursts of creativity occur. However, at the strategic level, more than just bureaucracy impedes imagination since, typically, those who rise in the system
do so by learning what is or is not likely to gain them
acceptance by “Higher.” The conditioning begins early. Or as a captain pointed out in a class many years
ago: lieutenants don’t know enough to realize what
isn’t possible; MAJs, LTCs, and COLs do, and so they
self-censor.
The press of time also causes senior leaders to be
in a perpetual hunt for silver bullets, a hunt that helps
explain the rapid lionization of individuals like Jim
Gant. It also helps explain why efforts like VSO were
conducted countrywide in Afghanistan despite being
suitable only for certain locales. Or why “three cups of
tea” became a mantra for how everyone should build
rapport.
“Next new things” that promise a shortcut and/
or easy mass production are understandably alluring, especially since whether they actually address the
problem at hand only seems to matter in retrospect
and/or should they fail outright. For instance, GEN
Dempsey’s “Mission Command” White Paper cites
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the decision cycle of observe, orient, decide, and act,
(OODA loop)—which may have been a brilliant tool
for re-conceptualizing air-to-air dogfights. But the
idea of creating “situations wherein one can make
appropriate decisions more quickly than one’s opponent,” only—maybe—works when confronting nearpeer competitors who either already think like us or
whose decision-making we know we can accurately
predict.150 Thus far, no evidence suggests that we
can out-adapt non-peer non-Westerners. More to the
point, as important as getting inside the adversary’s
decision cycle might seem, doing so does not address
how to get the adversary to undo himself.
Nor do we seem to be any closer to cracking the
code on the method that GEN McChrystal describes
his strategic hero, ADM Horatio Nelson, using: “His
genius was to organize the force into a lethal machine,
bring the enemy to battle on his terms, and then unleash the apparatus on the enemy.”151 While GEN
McChrystal certainly did organize his Task Forces
into lethal machines, and unleashed them on the enemy, no U.S. entity has brought an enemy to battle on
our terms in a shooting war since World War II.152 Nor
does it seem that anyone is being encouraged to try to
do so.
War used to be the great simplifier. People went to
war to resolve irresolvable political differences (or to
work out ethnic enmities, religious hatreds, etc.). Today we do not use war in these ways. Instead, we treat
it like a wicked problem, forgetting that wicked problems themselves can be simplified—though doing so
requires that a decisive leader make a hard choice
rather than try to pick his way through a tangle. Hard
choices used to belong to supreme commanders. Unfortunately, without a supreme commander and with
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no one in charge, decisiveness has devolved so that
no one bears responsibility for needing to be decisive
today.153
Many might argue that how a war is conducted is
a political responsibility, and thereby belongs to the
President. Others believe that supreme command
must always rest with civilian leaders. But Herman
Wouk offers an interestingly different perspective
when he limns his fictional German general in The
Winds of War:
Winston Churchill, in a revealing passage of his memoirs on the functioning of his chiefs of staff, expresses
his envy of Hitler, who could get his decisions acted
upon without submitting them to the discouragement
and pulling apart of hide-bound professional soldiers.
In fact, this was what saved England and won the war.
Churchill was exactly the kind of brilliant amateur
meddler in military affairs that Hitler was. Both rose
to power from the depths of political rejection. Both
relied chiefly on oratory to sway the multitude. Both
somehow expressed the spirit of their peoples, and so
won loyalty that outlasted any number of mistakes, defeats, and disasters. Both thought in grandiose terms,
knew little about economic and logistical realities, and
cared less. Both were iron men in defeat. Above all,
both men had overwhelming personalities that could
silence rational opposition while they talked. Of this
strange phenomenon, I had ample and bitter experience with Hitler. The crucial difference was that in
the end Churchill had to listen to the professionals,
whereas the German people had committed itself to
the fatal Fuhrerprinzip [emphasis added].154

If we pay attention to Wouk’s General Armin von
Roon, one conclusion it should lead us to is that GOs
actually have a duty to demand “singular hierarchy
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+ ownership” once the decision to deploy troops has
been made.
Some civil-military relations scholars might scoff
at such a notion, but this is one among many reasons
that civil-military relations deserve a serious 21stcentury rethink.155 First, defense intellectuals cannot
contend that warfare has become so complex that
only professionals can wage it, and then assume that
a civilian commander in chief who lacks deep military
knowledge will not become overwhelmed or, worse,
paralyzed by its complexity. Second, chronic deference on the part of military leaders when it comes
to the civilians they say are responsible for making
policy enables them to shirk.156 Not having to be fully
responsible—not having to own the war—makes it far
too easy for them to shift blame after the fact. Yet, after
the fact is far too late for the O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s who
get stuck having to try to set objectives for their units
in year X of an objectiveless war.
Final Thought.
Since today’s O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s are the only pool
from which tomorrow’s senior leaders will come, paying attention to what has shaped them should matter.
But so, too, should a parallel issue. The military has
not yet been rent asunder by what has consumed so
many other institutions: namely, whether the institution should cave, cater, or stand strong when it comes
to shifting societal mores.
All one need do is look at the turmoil underway in
and around other venerable organizations—like most
religious bodies—to see where splits can lead, though
the U.S. military does retain at least one considerable
advantage over any other institution. There is still only
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one template for how to build a professional military
capable of projecting force—and that is via hierarchy.
A second advantage the military has in the face of
changing social mores is that the challenges today’s
youth present are the same challenges youth have
always presented. Young people typically dislike
authority, favor egalitarianism, and try to avoid too
much structure.
This, too, returns us to certain givens about human
nature. Although not enough is known about Generation Y, evidence suggests that Millennials are little
different from preceding generations with one notable
exception: their willingness, and even eagerness, to
communicate whatever they feel like with whomever
they choose.157 Tellingly, what young Service members signal whenever they go straight to the top, bypassing the chain of command, is that they really do
believe everyone is equal.158 The challenge this then
presents the military is how to convey to them (and to
future generations) that what all uniformed personnel
should want is, actually, well-led hierarchy that will
provide them with clear objectives and the prospect of
a decisive win.159
As for what constitutes “well-led,” those selected
for command should not only want to unleash the talent that exists beneath them, but should have a proven
record of knowing how. They should be astute judges
of affinities, and should be able to read, vet, and assess
people and situations quickly and accurately.
Significantly, nothing about today’s youth suggests they would balk at leaders with these kinds of
aptitudes. Just the opposite. Who doesn’t want leaders who ask people to think, rather than just defer?
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about 21st-century sensibilities. For more on these, see Anna Simons, 21st Century Cultures of War: Advantage Them, Philadelphia,
PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 2013. Bottom line: we
have changed our attitudes. What war could be has not changed.
109. Muth, p. 210.
110. Which is not to say the “Five I’s” or certain other
militaries do not share this as well.
111. For a description of how SF does this (when it does this
well), see Simon Powelson, “Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic Engagement No: Lessons for SOF from Mali,” Master’s Thesis,
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2013.
112. Individual improvement is, of course, always possible—
otherwise basic training would never work. But: a) basic training doesn’t re-make everyone, and b) it certainly doesn’t re-make
everyone alike. The more important point is that while it might
be possible to change the dynamic between any two or more individuals, the parameters for how humans interact are fairly set.
Or, to channel what a Marine infantry platoon leader said to
me in a different context: “if people have changed so much over
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time, why do we still read Clausewitz and Sun Tzu? Why does
anyone think they’re still relevant?”
113. Of course, not all people want this, since some revel in
(and profit from) turmoil.
114. Charles Stross, “A sci-fi visionary on why the children
of tomorrow are the NSA’s biggest nightmare,” Foreign Policy,
August 28, 2013, writes:
We human beings are primates. We have a deeply ingrained
set of cultural and interpersonal behavioral rules that we
violate only at social cost. One of these rules, essential for a
tribal organism, is bilaterality: Loyalty is a two-way street.
(Another is hierarchy: Yield to the boss.) Such rules are not
iron-bound or immutable—we’re not robots—but our new
hive superorganism employers don’t obey them instinctively, and apes and monkeys and hominids tend to revert
to tit-for-tat strategies readily when they’re unsure of their
relative status. Perceived slights result in retaliation, and
blundering, human-blind orgs can bruise an employee’s ego
without even noticing. And slighted or bruised employees
who lack instinctive loyalty, because the culture they come from
has spent generations systematically destroying social hierarchies
and undermining their sense of belonging, are much more likely
to start thinking the unthinkable [italics added].

115. A description borrowed from the ONA-sponsored
“Military Officer of 2030” Summer Study, 2003.
116. Toddi Gutner, “Why You May Be Deferential To Peers—
but Not Your Boss,” The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2014.
117. Jeffrey Pfeffer, “You’re Still the Same: Why Theories of
Power Hold over Time and Across Contexts,” The Academy of
Management Perspectives, Vol. 27, Iss. 4, November 1, 2013, p. 272.
118. McChrystal, p. 391.
119. GEN McChrystal may think he put together a network—
which he did via liaisons with other organizations. But as far as
his subordinates were concerned he was their undisputed leader
and clear boss; he set the standards; he axed people when they
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didn’t or couldn’t meet those standards. Notably, it was only his
organization conducting the strikes; everyone else assisted with
them.
120. Shamir, p. 15.
121. Cray, p. 272.
122. Wouk, War & Remembrance, p. 1152.
123. This is one reason astute commanders make liberal use of
liaisons—to coordinate, but also to stay apprised of what others
are up to. The flip side to liaisons serving as conduits is that they
can end up being considered “spies” when relations are rocky.
124. Cray, p. 7. Of course, cynics might contend that the
fact there seems to be no need for truly deliberative speed today proves that combatants might take fighting seriously, but
the “war” in Afghanistan as a war has not been taken seriously
enough by Washington.
125. At a minimum, a singular command structure and direct
lines of authority would also obviate much of the time spent on
video teleconferences (VTCs) and in other forums posturing and
talking about the importance of collaboration—time that could be
better invested in a more honest (and direct) exchange of information and perspectives. One SF officer in Afghanistan in July 2013
observed:
This war has totally gutted a good prior working relationship or trust with command. You have to be able to call the
CO and ask questions on the phone—not over the radio so
that, thanks to flat comms [communications], everyone can
hear. Probably bad decisions are made because of a reluctance to pick up the phone and an overall lack of confidence
in relations between command and the team on the ground.

126. Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The
Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-7, London, UK: Hurst
Publishers Limited, 2007, p. 195.
127. Ricks, p. 456.
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128. McChrystal, p. 379.
129. And here I am not referring to his unexpected removal, but what would have been the usual general officer (GO)
turnover.
130. Comment made by a noncommissioned officer (NCO) in
Afghanistan, July 2013.
131. Stephen Gerras and Leonard Wong, Changing Minds in
the Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What To Do About It, Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October
2013, pp. 21-22.
132. For an example of what should be possible, here is a
description from Cloud and Jaffe, p. 105:
Many officers in Casey’s position would have felt threatened
by the high-flying Abizaid, who at the time was the youngest general in the Army. Casey chose to embrace the newcomer . . . Abizaid was a different kind of officer who sought
answers to problems that most officers didn’t see. Instead of
focusing downward on his troops, he thought about how
forces such as radical Islam were transforming the Middle
East and could create new problems for the United States.

Worth noting, too, is luck, timing, and the braiding of careers—
working together in Bosnia had “turned Casey and Abizaid into
close friends,” p. 105.
133. Of course, subordinate commanders would likely continue to jockey their way up the command track. Certainly, command during World War II was never friction or ego-free. Yet, the
quip that honesty starts at the top helps make the broader point I
am heading toward: there needs to be “a” top.
134. Horn, p. 245.
135. Cloud and Jaffe, p. 100. It is tempting to see all sorts
of foreshadowing in this, particularly when looking at various
hagiographic accounts about the Surge.
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136. Ibid.
137. Ricks, pp. 311-312; Although the best characterization,
and one that many would still find relevant, is the one sentence
summary (made by COL Malone, an Army infantry officer turned
social psychologist and one of the report’s authors): “Duty, honor
and country” had been replaced by “Me, my ass and my career.”
138. For more on other aspects of how the last decade of war
has affected combat veterans (to include society’s responses), see
Simons, 21st Century Cultures of War.
139. Tyson, p. 109.
140. Ibid., p. 212.
141. Unless, of course, the entire command team turned rogue
and sought to stay in Afghanistan indefinitely.
142. Tyson, p. 164.
143. Wilson, p. 105.
144. Pfeffer, p. 275. The remainder of Pfeffer’s paragraph:
Rosabeth Kanter’s (1977) apt phrase, ‘homosocial reproduction,’ describes what is most commonly observed in organizational hiring, promotion, and review processes (even in
academia): the bias toward similarity. It is of course possible
for people to strategically present their similarity to those
in power by dressing, speaking, expressing attitudes, and
acting in ways that remind powerful others of themselves.

For a vivid military example, consider Clay Blair’s assessment of Don Faith, an Army O-5 during the Korean War in Ricks,
p. 169:
Eight years after OCS [Officer Candidate School], leading
a beleaguered regimental combat team in Korea, he knew
how to look like a commander. ‘On the battlefield, Faith was
a clone of Ridgway: intense, fearless, relentlessly aggressive,
and unforgiving of error or caution’. . . . Yet for all that. . .
Faith did not really know how to command.
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145. Kane, p. 128.
146. Ray Fisman and Tim Sullivan, The Org: The Underlying
Logic of the Office, New York: Twelve, 2013, p. 53: “Any organization has to have both stars and guardians, carefully balanced.”
Or, as we wrote in the ONA-sponsored “Military Officer of 2030”
Summer Study, 2003:
taking note of those who excel in chaotic situations does not
mean that risk-averse officers don’t have essential roles to
play. Some positions should only be filled by painstakingly
reserved and detail-oriented individuals. We would submit
that auditors, for instance, or nuclear engineers should be
of this type.

147. This is something we noted in the ONA-sponsored
“Military Officer of 2030” Summer Study, 2003.
148. One possibility is that rather than CGs convening councils of GOs, or turning to outside experts who are likely to defer
because deference is built into how GOs are treated, they need to
hear from councils of O-4s to O-6s (as well as from senior NCOs).
Let subordinates and peers choose those whom they consider to
be unsettlingly, pragmatically smart. Facilitate discussions with
no GOs present. Scrub names and identifying information from
the transcript. Submit it. Maybe even circulate it.
Even more prudent would be to elicit from O-4s, O-5s, O-6s,
and senior enlisted what sorts of checks they think would or
wouldn’t work, and what would or wouldn’t be needed when it
comes to “singular hierarchy + ownership.” Perhaps they would
want to jettison the whole idea and offer something in its stead
that could guarantee coherent command.
149. Wilson, p. 374.
150. Dempsey, “Mission Command,” White Paper, p. 4.
151. McChrystal, p. 148.
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152. Consider the contrast, see Cray, p. 241; here Cray is
describing a meeting in the Oval Office on November 25, 1941:
The assault would come as early as the following Monday,
December 1, the president estimated, ‘for the Japanese are
notorious for making an attack without warning. The question is how we should maneuver them into the position of
firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to
ourselves.’

153. At least not as of the time of publication.
154. Herman Wouk, The Winds of War, Boston, MA: Little
Brown and Company, 1978, pp. 290-291.
155. For instance, see Cloud and Jaffe, p. 136:
The civilians set the policy and it was the military’s job to
execute it. Every senior commander struggled with how far
to go in offering advice on policy issues, but in Iraq, where
bad policy decisions were driving the insurgency, finding
the right balance was especially tough. Should he [Abizaid]
emphasize the positive assessments coming from his subordinate commanders? Or should he focus on the deep policy
disagreements he and his commanders had with Bremer
and others in the administration? Was that really his job?
There were no clear answers.

156. Case in point number 1: When GEN McChrystal writes,
“As a professional soldier I was committed to implementing to
the best of my ability any policy selected by civilian leadership,”
see McChrystal, p. 352, one has to wonder—any policy?! Case in
point number 2, see Kaplan, p. 127:
Rumsfeld respected a certain amount of pushback; he’d
been puzzled why so many generals cowered at his criticism. (Most of these generals, in turn, wondered if Rumsfeld
didn’t grasp the American officer corps’s post-MacArthur
allegiance to the principle of civilian control, which made
them disinclined to talk back to a secretary of defense.)
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157. Described in greater depth in a report I co-authored and
turned into the N-1, U.S. Navy, see Anna Simons and Anita Salem, “21st Century Retention Challenges for the Navy: Generational Changes, Attitudinal Effects, and their Impact on Operations,” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, October 2014.
158. Or that they are indispensably special.
159. Otherwise, not understanding or not being clued in as to
why they are being asked to do what they are doing may prove
increasingly rankling to some members of the younger generation who could turn out to be more vocal, or more prone to going
to the media, than their elders ever were; Chelsea Manning and
Edward Snowden may simply be harbingers.
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